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The structural problems brought to light by the finan-
cial crisis have largely remained in place or shifted
from the private (banking) sector to the public sector.
In the United States, despite increased saving, house-
hold debt remains high; their wealth position has
deteriorated substantially due to the bursting of the
house price bubble. The real estate sector has shrunk,
and the financial sector has still not fully recovered. 
Owing to similar corrections in real estate markets, a
number of European countries, i.e. Spain, the United
Kingdom and Ireland, also find themselves in vulner-
able positions. Furthermore, in most industrialised
countries, the public finance situation, which was
already strained in several cases before the crisis, has
deteriorated drastically. Largely forced by reactions of
financial markets, fiscal policies in most of these
countries have switched to a consolidation course.
Also in key emerging countries, fiscal policies have
turned restrictive. Unlike in the advanced world, mon-
etary policies in these countries have already changed
course and have become less accommodative or even
restrictive. The economic recovery in many emerging
countries has already progressed so far that policy-
makers are now striving to prevent their economies
from overheating.
At the global level, imbalances appear to be re-emerg-
ing and have reached centre-stage in many policy dis-
cussions. While China is being blamed for restricting
its capital inflow and keeping its exchange rate stable
vis-à-vis the US dollar, thereby preventing a swifter
loss in global competitiveness, the United States is
again increasingly living beyond its means. This time
around it is the public sector that is in need of foreign
capital. Historically, a part of the solution to such
structurally diverging developments has been a move
towards flexible exchange rates. Recent success stories
in both Asia and Latin America are, however, largely
associated with relatively fixed exchange rates. The
political reluctance to leave this path is therefore
understandable. In the euro area, where such structur-
al problems have emerged on a more regional level,
the economic and political costs of a dissolving mon-
etary union are still considered to be larger than its
benefits. Instead structural reforms and steps towards
a stronger political union appear to be the only course
to take.
The weakening of world economic dynamism,
observed during the second half of last year, will keep
growth subdued in most advanced economies during
2011. In the United States, due to the continuing struc-
tural problems, a strong upturn is not in sight. Mainly
as a consequence of the dampening effects of the pro-
nounced restrictive fiscal policies, the on-going recov-
ery in Europe also remains subdued. In most emerging
countries, the pace of expansion remains comparably
high. Nevertheless, growth rates will stay below the
levels reached last year. World trade, which last year
increased by over 12 percent, will return to normal and
accordingly achieve growth rates only about half as
high. The remaining underutilisation in many
advanced economies and more moderate growth in the
emerging world will keep inflation rates low. 
1.2 The current situation
1.2.1 The global economy
After registering an overall negative growth rate 
(–0.6 percent) in 2009 for the first time since the Se-
cond World War, the annual growth of the world
economy clearly showed a rebound in 2010 and is
expected to have reached 4.8 percent. However, dur-
ing the course of 2010, the recovery of the world
economy slowed down. After collapsing during win-
ter 2008/09, world trade grew quickly for four quar-
ters in a row, and with hindsight one can say that the
world economy as measured by either trade or indus-
trial production has witnessed a V-shaped recovery.
World trade has almost reached pre-crisis levels (see
Figure 1.1). However, since last summer the recovery
has at least temporarily lost speed. 
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and Japanese economies lost
momentum considerably this
spring after a strong expansion
during the winter months. For
the euro area, it is apparent that
the high production growth wit-
nessed in the second quarter of
2010 and largely driven by
German developments has not
lasted in subsequent quarters.
Even in the emerging countries,
the pace of output has slowed.
Whereas industrial production in
emerging and developing coun-
tries has been able to return to its
long-term growth path and sur-
passed its pre-crisis level by
about 15 percent, in the advanced
countries it is still far from pre-
crisis levels (see Figure 1.2). Here,
industrial production is still
approximately 10 percent below
the level reached shortly before
the start of the financial crisis in
2008, i.e. not even half of the
drop has been regained since
spring 2009. Especially in the
industrial world, capacity utilisa-
tion rates in industry are there-
fore still at historically low levels.
The results of the Ifo World
Economic Survey also show that
during the past years develop-
ments between the major conti-
nents have not been completely
synchronised. The climate in
Latin America and Asia re-
mained better than that in North
America and until recently in
Western Europe (see Figure 1.3).
Nevertheless, improvements took
place in all major regions during
the first half of last year. Patterns
have been diverging since then.
Whereas the assessments of the
economic situation in Western
Europe continued to rise, they
have basically stagnated at high
levels in the emerging economies.
Due to a drop at the end of last
year, the assessment level in
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North America is again below those of these other
regions.
After current account balances were significantly
reduced in 2009 in absolute terms, last year saw a
moderate step back towards the pre-crisis levels (see
Figure 1.4). Of those countries running current
account deficits, the larger deficits in both the United
Kingdom and the United States accounted for most
of this increase. The demand impulses of these two
countries were met by increased net exports of most
of the surplus economies. Of these, only China was an
exception to this rule. Albeit at a lesser pace than the
year before, it continued to reduce its current account
surplus and via strong domestic growth gave further
impulses to the rest of the world. Furthermore, most
other deficit countries, and in particular Spain,
Australia, Italy and Greece, have
been successful in trying to
improve their current accounts
and hence have, from this per-
spective, also been able to benefit
from developments in the United
States, the United Kingdom and
China.
After the drop in prices during
2009, inflation picked up some-
what to levels around 1.5 percent
last year. To a large extent these
fluctuations were driven by move-
ment in energy and raw material
prices (see Figure 1.5). A barrel of
oil cost around 40 US dollars in
early 2009 but that same year its
price climbed to almost 80 US
dollars, a level at which it hovered
throughout 2010. Also other raw
materials saw sharp price increas-
es at the end of 2009 and early
2010. Whereas in many develop-
ing and emerging countries this
led to inflationary pressures, in the
industrialised world low capacity
utilisation rates kept inflation con-
tained and deflationary fears alive.
1.2.2 United States
In the United States, the strong
economic expansion witnessed
during the winter of 2009/2010,
with an annualised increase of 3.8 percent, slowed
down over the course of last year. With an annu-
alised increase of GDP of 2.4 percent during the
summer half year, the slowdown was less pro-
nounced than many expected. Also in the last quar-
ter of 2010 annualised growth, at 3.2 percent, stayed
well above recessionary levels (see Figure 1.6).
Hence, the fear often stated during the summer and
autumn that the United States would fall back into
recession has not materialised. Overall, GDP in 2010
ended up 2.9 percent higher than in 2009 (see
Table 1.A.1 in Appendix 1.A).
The loss in growth momentum has several causes
mostly related to the structural problems the US econ-
omy is facing. Although house prices seem to have
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Figure 1.5tor remain and the recovery of the financial sector is
far from being completed. The resulting hike in unem-
ployment, together with the still high indebtedness of
the household sector as well as the rising public debt,
will affect economic developments in the United
States in the years to come.
From a business cycle perspective, the reduction in
inventories induced by a surge in liquidity demand by
firms at the peak of the financial crisis reversed and
created a strong growth impulse during the first part
of last year. Inventory cycles are generally not long-
lived and the positive impulses have come to an end by
now. This alone will lead to a slowdown in growth
over the winter half year. 
The increase in the investment share witnessed since
mid-2009 is almost entirely due to this inventory cycle.
Gross fixed capital formation has
done little more than stopped
declining (see Figure 1.7). Al-
though the growth rate of invest-
ment in equipment and software
reached double-digits throughout
2010 due to catch-up effects, this
was counterbalanced by construc-
tion investment continuing to fall.
Due to the phasing out of the
Home-Buyer Tax Credit Program,
a temporary hike in residential in-
vestment (and thereby in gross
domestic fixed capital formation)
resulted in the second quarter of
last year. 
Although house prices stopped
falling in early 2009, the real estate sector will still
need time to recover. New building permits of new
private housing units remain around all-time lows and
the number of employees working in the residential
building sector continues to decline. In the second half
of last year, the number of loans that entered the fore-
closure process even started to pick up again, despite
the continuing fall in effective interest rates paid on
home mortgages.
Despite the continuing problems in the real estate
market and the associated deleveraging of the house-
hold sector as well as high unemployment and only
moderate wage increases, private consumption has
become a stabilising factor for the US economy.
Throughout last year, consumption grew at rates of
around 2 percent or above. Compared to before the
crisis, these growth rates can only be described as at
most moderate. However, they
now appear more sustainable and
stable. In that sense, private con-
sumption has again become the
backbone of the US economy.
Consequently, private savings
have come down a bit from the
high levels reached in 2009. Still,
a share of personal savings in dis-
posable income of 5.3 percent (in
November 2010) – down from
over 6 percent during mid-year –
implies a tripling of the shares
observed in 2005–2007. At the
same time, net household lending
as a percentage of GDP remain-
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ed positive at 4.1 percent in the third quarter of 2010
(see Figure 1.8).
Nevertheless, fiscal policy became slightly less
accommodating during the fiscal year 2010 (Oc-
tober 2009–September 2010) as compared to the
year before. The budget deficit decreased by 122 bil-
lion to 1.3 trillion US dollars, or
8.9 percent of GDP (as com-
pared to 10 percent in fiscal
2009). This historically huge
deficit of the US government is
also reflected in a net govern-
ment lending position of
10.4 percent of GDP in the
third quarter of 2010 (see
Figure 1.8). This small reduc-
tion in the deficit was especially
helped by lower expenses to
support the ailing banking sec-
tor and the mortgage financiers
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
that were placed under state
supervision. Compared to the
previous year, the support for
them fell by 367 billion US
dollars. 
In contrast, spending in the
context of the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) rose by 110 billion to
225 billion US dollars. This
stimulus package underwent
additional spending to alleviate
fiscal crises at the state level, to
finance the Home-Buyer Tax
Credit Program, and to extend
the duration of public unem-
ployment benefits. Due to the
lack of recovery in labour mar-
kets and its extended duration,
total spending on the unem-
ployment system rose again by a
third to 162 billion US dollars.
This is more than three times as
much as in 2008.
Net lending of the United
States, and thereby the US cur-
rent account balance, can be
decomposed into net lending of
the household, business and
government sectors (see Fi-
gure 1.8). Whereas the government sector is bor-
rowing heavily, both the household and business
sectors have turned into net lenders during and
after the financial crisis. Profits of US firms have
increased substantially during the recovery of the
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Figure 1.9about future US developments has kept firms from
fully investing these funds domestically.
The stabilisation of the domestic economy, in partic-
ular via stable consumption growth and an uplift in
equipment and software investment, has led to dou-
ble-digit growth in imports. Whereas the weak dollar
also fostered export dynamics, the current account
and trade balance nevertheless deteriorated again – a
process that started in mid-2009. 
During summer and autumn of 2010, substantial job
cuts in the public sector put a drag on employment
developments. Although the census that was carried
out last year distorted within-year developments of
the number of employees in the public sector – census
interviewers were first temporarily engaged and sub-
sequently released again – about 220,000 jobs have
disappeared in the public sector since the beginning of
last year (see Figure 1.9). In the private sector, on the
contrary, about 1.3 million jobs – of which well over
90 percent were in non-financial services – have been
created.
Despite this turnaround in employment develop-
ments, the US labour market remains in a dismal
state. The unemployment rate of 9.4 percent in
December of last year remains at a historically very
high level and does not even fully reflect the actual
labour market situation (see Figure 1.10). Given the
high proportion of long-term unemployed in total
unemployment, it appears that the functioning of the
labour market has been negatively affected by low
spatial mobility of over-indebted homeowners.
Furthermore, the unemployment rate underestimates
the inequalities in the labour market: the number of
discouraged workers hat increased substantially.
In the United States, the number of unemployed
workers went up by 7.35 million from the second
quarter of 2008 onwards. During the same time span,
employment declined by about 6.66 million people.
This implies an increase in the labour force of almost
690 thousand people. However, at the same time, the
working-age population has increased by about
5.88 million people. That is to say, since the start of
the crisis, the United States has seen almost 5.2 mil-
lion people leaving the labour force – either voluntar-
ily or involuntarily (see Figure 1.38). Consequently,
the labour market participation rate has dropped by
about 2 percentage points to 64.5 percent since the
beginning of 2007, which is the lowest level since the
mid-1980s. 
As part of the continuing difficulties in the labour
market, nominal wages rose only modestly. Real dis-
posable income, the most important determinant of
private consumption, has nevertheless recovered
somewhat during the second half of the year. The
share of public transfer payments in disposable
income, at about 20 percent, is ca. 5 percentage points
above its long-term level.
After having picked up at the end of 2009, inflation
fell significantly over the course of 2010. Also the core
index for personal consumption expenditure – which
is the preferred inflation measure of the Federal
Reserve – decelerated to 0.8 percent in November.
This is the lowest level since records began in the
1950s. Crucial to this development was the continuing
crisis in the housing market. The
residential component, which
accounts for about 40 percent of
the overall price index, has fallen
for two years now. Another brake
on price dynamics has been the
decline in unit labour costs. These
fell by 0.9 percent in 2010 (see
Table 1.1). 
1.2.3 Asia
The expansion of the Chinese
economy has – after its above-
average pace during winter
2009/10 – slowed somewhat dur-
ing the past quarters. The year-

























Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, last accessed on 19 January 2011.
Unemployment rates
% of labour force
United Kingdom
Figure 1.10EEAG Report 2011 23
Chapter 1
on-year increase in GDP of 11.9 percent at the begin-
ning of last year was followed by rates of 10.3, 9.6 and
9.8 percent in the subsequent quarters. This slowdown
was mainly due to a reduction in industrial output.
Similar developments have not been observed in the
primary and tertiary sectors. For 2010, this results in
a rise in GDP in China (including Hong Kong) of
9.7 percent.
The decreasing economic dynamism is likely to be
due primarily to the efforts of the government to
tackle the overheating property market and high
lending activities through a much tighter monetary
policy. The People’s Bank of China increased the
banks’ reserve ratio six times and raised its interest
rates twice last year, in October and December. It
appears that using reserve ratios to rein in liquidity
and credit is no longer enough, and that adjusting
interest rates is needed to get price pressures under
control. In particular, credit growth is still above the
government’s target. Furthermore, faced with rising
real estate prices, lending requirements were tight-
ened and additional restrictions to reduce specula-
tive transactions on the real estate market, i.e. to
curb speculation and to prevent the hoarding of
construction land, were implemented. However,
while consumer price inflation rose strongly to
5.1 percent in November, and producer price infla-
tion to 6.1 percent, this is almost entirely due to
increases in food prices. Administrative measures to
counter further increases are likely to be implement-
ed in the first half of 2011.
The slowdown in growth of GDP has been accompa-
nied by a shift of growth contributions. Whereas the
more restrictive monetary conditions and the phasing
































Germany 1.1 2.0 0.2 1.2 0.4 3.3 0.6  –1.5  –0.5 –3.3  0.6 5.0 
France  2.7 2.8 0.9 2.4 0.7 1.6 2.0 0.8 0.4 –5.0  –2.5 0.4 
Italy  2.1 0.8  –0.4 0.1  –0.4 1.4 3.2  –0.4 2.7 –3.4  –4.6  –1.2 
Spain  3.2 1.1  –0.2 0.7 0.5 1.8 3.3  –1.2 1.9 –1.7  –0.9 0.1 
Nether-
lands  3.3 1.4 0.9  –0.2 0.8 2.4 2.6  –0.7 0.3 –4.4  0.1 0.2 
Belgium 2.7 0.9 0.8  –0.5 0.7 1.6 2.3  –0.4 0.9 –4.3  –1.4  –0.3 
Austria  2.2 0.7 0.7  –0.8 0.9 1.3 1.2  –0.3  –0.6  0.5  –0.2  –2.3 
Greece  2.2 –1.5  4.1 –0.6  0.8  –5.9  –1.1 –9.6 
Finland  3.2 1.2 1.8  –0.5 1.2 3.0 2.1  –1.0  –2.0 –5.5  –0.9  –5.9 
Ireland  4.4  –2.1 2.0  –0.4 2.0 3.6 3.3  –5.0  –0.9  –11.8  2.3  –0.8 
Portugal 3.8 2.5 1.1 1.4 0.9 2.7  –1.5  –0.5 
Slovakia 8.3 2.6 4.2 2.5 3.9 5.8 3.0  –3.1 0.0 –0.9  2.5 3.6 
United
Kingdom 3.7 3.8 1.3 0.5 1.1 1.7 2.8 1.0  –0.7  6.4  –1.9  –5.5 
Sweden  3.0 1.0 1.3  –0.1 1.4 3.2 1.9  –1.8  –2.7  2.4  –0.4 0.9 
Denmark 3.4 2.1 1.2  –0.8 0.6 4.0 3.1  –1.3  –0.3  –6.5 
Poland  4.8 6.5 1.3 4.5 3.7 2.5 2.4 2.9  –3.9  0.7  3.0 1.7 
Czech 
Republic 6.2 2.3 3.8 2.3 3.0 3.7 2.8  –2.1 2.3  1.9  4.2 0.8 
Hungary 8.0 0.4 1.9  –1.2 2.6 1.4 6.4 0.4 2.0 –6.3  4.7 3.9 
Iceland  6.4 6.2 0.7 0.2 1.9  –2.9 5.4 8.4  –2.5 13.9  1.6  –8.6 
Norway  5.3 3.1 0.3  –1.1 0.9 0.4 4.3 3.0 2.7  7.1  –2.8  –9.8 
Switzer-
land  2.0 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.6 2.1 1.6  –1.1  –0.1 0.0 
Japan  –1.0 1.4 0.2 3.2 1.0 4.1  –1.4  –2.2  –2.6 –5.4  –3.4 8.5 
United
States  3.6 2.2 1.4 1.1 1.8 3.3 2.0  –0.9  –3.4 –5.8  –1.4  –1.6 
Canada  3.3 2.0 1.0  –0.8 0.7 1.3 2.6 0.9 4.4  5.7  –3.3  –6.1 
China  11.4 15.8 
a) Compensation per employee in the private sector. – 
b) Compensation per employee deflated by GDP Deflator. – 
c) Total Economy. – 
d) Manufacturing sector. – 
e) Competitiveness– weighted relative unit labour costs in dollar terms.
– 
f) Ratio between export volumes and export markets for total goods and services. A positive number indicates gains 
in market shares and a negative number indicates a loss in market shares.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2010, Issue 2, November 2010.out of fiscal stimulus measures – in particular infra-
structure projects – reduced the impulses coming from
the domestic economy, the trade sector gained impor-
tance again, although the increase in the trade balance
was muted due to the loss in terms of trade caused by
higher import prices for raw materials. Nevertheless,
this led to increased fears that the global macroeco-
nomic imbalances will soon reach pre-crisis levels
again. As a consequence, the political pressure on the
Chinese authorities to appreciate the renminbi
increased. Last June, the government re-started its
programme to allow for a steady nominal apprecia-
tion of the renminbi against the US dollar, which it
originally initiated in July 2005 but suspended during
the crisis. Since then, the renminbi has been allowed
to appreciate by a moderate 2.5 percent. 
In Japan the economic recovery continued throughout
the summer of 2010. During the second quarter, total
economic output expanded by an annualised growth
rate of 3.0 percent. This increased to 4.5 percent in the
third quarter, driven by strong growth in domestic
demand. Consumer demand surged before the end of
subsidies for the purchase of environmentally friendly
automobiles and appliances. Fixed capital formation
has been expanding for more than a year now. Despite
experiencing a repeated double-digit increase in
exports, for the first time since the end of the reces-
sion foreign trade no longer contributed significantly
to growth; thanks to strong domestic demand,
imports increased more than exports.
The slightly larger GDP increase in the third quarter
of last year hid however the weakening economic ten-
dencies also observed in Japan. Recent data indicate
that the pace of the recovery has currently come to a
virtual standstill. In particular, export and industrial
production growth showed declines towards the end
of 2010. The appreciation of the yen and the slow-
down of other Asian economies, notably China, are
mainly responsible for this.
The observed increase in private consumption was
largely induced by an additional stimulus package of
the government. Although some subsidy programmes
will continue to run until mid-year, the removal of
these support measures has already affected durable
goods consumption this winter. For example, auto-
mobile sales, which in the third quarter of last year
rose particularly sharply, have probably already
declined in the fourth quarter. Private investment,
however, has continued to rise slightly. Government
consumption and public investment stagnated or even
declined significantly.
To support the economy, to fight against the appreci-
ation of the yen and to try to halt the continuing
deflation, the Japanese Central Bank cut its main
interest rate (from 0.1 to between 0 and 0.1 percent),
intervened in the foreign exchange market and pur-
chased securities. However, as the volumes of these
transactions have been less than in other countries, its
effects are expected to remain small. Because of the
large carry-over from 2009 and strong growth rates in
the first three quarters, the increase in economic out-
put in 2010 is still expected to be around 4.4 percent.
In  India overall economic activity continued to
expand very quickly. After GDP grew by year-on-year
rates of 8.6 in the first quarter, it increased by 8.9 per-
cent in both the second and third quarter. This devel-
opment was mainly due to strong domestic demand,
while foreign trade did not provide a significant impe-
tus. On the production side, the economic pace accel-
erated in both agriculture and services. On the other
hand, the manufacturing sector slowed down some-
what.
As a reaction to the rising inflationary tendencies,
over the last year the Reserve Bank of India increased
interest rates six times – from 4.75 to 6.25 percent.
Although inflation was reduced from 16.1 percent in
January 2010 to 8.3 percent in November, it still
remains well above the average of the past decade.
Especially food price inflation is still high and was
about 15 percent at the end of last year.
Also in the other East Asian countries, namely,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, GDP growth has some-
what slowed down after above average growth during
the first half of 2010. However, in those countries that
have experienced the sharpest rebound after the crisis,
GDP contracted in the third quarter (especially in
Singapore). Due to strong growth during the first half,
GDP is expected to have increased by 7.2 percent last
year.
1.2.4 Latin America
During the first half of 2010 almost all Latin
American economies grew strongly. The region com-
prising  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico
and  Venezuela, benefited in particular from rising
EEAG Report 2011 24
Chapter 1EEAG Report 2011 25
Chapter 1
prices for raw materials. And hence, the upswing is at
least partly on such exports. Prices for some industri-
al raw materials (agricultural raw materials, nonfer-
rous metals and iron ore) rose to an all-time high.
Along with these exports, this time around also
domestic demand, supported by solid employment
and real wage developments, gave strong impulses to
many of these economies. As a result of the econom-
ic boom, overall inflationary pressure increased sig-
nificantly. The Brazilian and Chilean central banks
have responded by increasing their prime rates. The
resulting lucrative returns, relative to low interest rates
in developed countries, and the good growth
prospects of the region since mid-2009 again resulted
in an increased influx of foreign capital. This inflow is
increasingly becoming a burden for the affected
economies. Their currencies are under increasing pres-
sure to appreciate against the US dollar, placing a
strain on their export industries. In addition, the
increased capital inflows pose a risk of the economies
overheating and the creation of domestic asset price
bubbles. Some governments in the region have already
responded to this by implementing tighter capital
controls. For instance, Brazil tripled its financial
transaction tax on foreign portfolio inflows into fixed
income securities to 6 percent in October.
During the second half of 2010, economic growth in
Latin America increased less rapidly. The main rea-
sons were the fading of stimulus measures and the
tightening of monetary policy but also the global eco-
nomic slowdown, accompanied by a lower demand
for raw materials. In 2010 GDP likely increased by a
total of 5.9 percent.
In Brazil, the increase in output was also due to an
increased consumer demand triggered by higher
income as well credit expansion made possible by
increased capital inflow. The presidential elections in
October last year also triggered an increase in govern-
ment consumption.
During the second quarter of last year, Mexico bene-
fited from strong import demand from the United
States. This was only short-lived, and as a result eco-
nomic growth declined somewhat during the second
half of last year.
Argentina benefited last year, especially from the good
harvest and rising international demand for agricul-
tural commodities. The export-oriented automobile
industry, has made a major contribution to the over-
all recovery of the Argentine economy. However, the
country is still suffering from high inflation.
According to unofficial estimates, consumer price
inflation amounted to around 25 percent last year –
substantially higher than suggested by the official sta-
tistics.
1.2.5 The European economy
The cyclical situation
After five quarters of negative growth, it was not until
the second half of 2009 that growth in the European
Union turned positive again. During the first half of
last year the economic recovery gained considerable
momentum and reached a peak of an annualised
4.2 percent of growth in GDP in the second quarter.
Although the economic recovery continued during the
second half of the year, its pace has clearly slowed. In
the third quarter, the annualised growth rate fell to
2 percent and is likely to have fallen below 1.5 percent
in the final quarter of last year. Overall this has result-
ed in a growth rate of 1.8 percent for 2010.
Private consumption expenditure continued its
rather weak recovery with annualised rates of
around 1.2 percent throughout the year (see Fi-
gure 1.11). It was mainly affected by high unemploy-
ment and since mid-2009 shrinking disposable
incomes. Still active stimulus measures in some core
European countries supported private consumption,
however, and allowed government consumption to
reach similar growth levels.
As consumption has been relatively stable, volatility in
growth resulted from investment activities, on the one
hand, and from international trade, on the other.
During the first half of the year a strong impulse
came from inventory investments, which were the
main drivers of growth (see Figure 1.12). This short-
lived cycle ceased to give further positive impulses
throughout the rest of the year. Private fixed capital
formation has not become a reliable pillar in the
recovery so far. Private investment demand has been
burdened by slowly increasing capacity utilisation and
remaining demand constraints. Only during the sec-
ond quarter was there a temporary uplift in invest-
ment and in particular in construction activities. This
was mainly caused by weather conditions, however. 
Developments in the construction sector have been of
key importance during the run-up to, and in the after-
math of, the financial crisis. Whereas the overallEuropean economy shrank by 4.2 percent in 2009,
value added in the construction sector plummeted by
more than double that amount. Already in 2008, fol-
lowing the bursting of bubbles in the housing markets
of peripheral European countries, the shrinking
process of the European construction sector began.
Although the recovery in many other sectors started
in mid-2009, a further deepening of the recession in
construction output is still likely to have occurred last
year.
Large differences in the speed of recovery of the con-
struction sector across countries exist. Especially the
countries that have been hit by
falling house prices, those that
face a severe sovereign debt cri-
sis, or both, have experienced
record declines in construction
activities. Spain, due to tremen-
dously high levels of unemploy-
ment and indebtedness and a
severe cutback in public spend-
ing, is witnessing a strong plunge
in construction activity. A pro-
longed and difficult time is also
expected in Ireland, where the
government is implementing an
extensive austerity programme.
But also countries without such
problems are witnessing a strong
reduction in output in this sec-
tor. For instance, Denmark, the
Netherlands and the Czech
Republic saw severe drops in
construction investment last
year. The reasons for these
slumps are of differing natures.
They include low construction
confidence as a psychological
factor, which induces the avoid-
ance of long-term commitments
in investments in Denmark, a
strong limitation of new con-
struction investments and re-
assessment of on-going projects
by a new government in the
Czech Republic and the fall in
demand, low consumer confi-
dence due to the international
financial instability as well as an
uncertain political situation in
the Netherlands.1
Countries like Finland, Poland, Germany and
Sweden have witnessed relatively strong construc-
tion growth. The highest boost in 2010, recorded in
Finland, is based on the stronger than ever con-
sumer confidence. Tax cuts to boost private con-
sumption, stimulus measures and the historically
low interest rates on housing loans led to consider-
able growth in residential construction and renova-
tion. The Polish economy is being steadily driven by
a stable increase of domestic consumption, which
has helped sustain construction developments. As
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Source: Eurostat, last accessed on 14 January 2011.
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1 See the 70th Euroconstruct report (Euroconstruct 2010) for more
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the biggest construction market in Europe, the
German market saw only a modest decline during
2009 and was able to pick up strongly again last
year. The low level of unemployment, the strongly
improved business confidence as well as government
stimulus programmes led to a quick recovery. The
dominance of more stable renovation and civil engi-
neering markets are behind the positive output of
the Swedish construction market.
After a sharp deterioration of the trade balance
early in the year, net exports managed to contribute
positively to the growth dynamics of the European
Union thereafter, even though the slowdown in the
global economy since summer 2010 caused export
growth to slow down. However, the phasing out of
the inventory cycle and still
moderate domestic demand
developments allowed imports
to increase even less. 
Differences across Europe
Across individual member states,
economic growth is still very
uneven. Only two countries –
Malta and Poland – have fully
compensated for the loss in GDP
that occurred during the crisis in
the third quarter of last year.
Greece and Romania are still in a
recessionary state and most oth-
ers have a substantial way to go
before catching up to pre-crisis
levels (see Figure 1.13). 
Export-oriented countries with a
relatively healthy public finance
situation, such as Germany, the
Netherlands, Finland and Aus-
tria, benefited from the positive
development in the rest of the
world and performed above the
EU average. Exactly the oppo-
site was observed in the coun-
tries of the European periphery
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain, GIPS). The extremely
sharp fiscal consolidation mea-
sures in these countries have
proven to be a heavy burden for
their local economies. As a con-
sequence, the recessions in
Greece and Ireland have contin-
ued, while the Spanish economy stagnated at the
beginning of the year. In Portugal, the recovery is
very fragile. A third group of countries – France,
Italy and Belgium – have experienced growth around
the European average. These countries were not
directly hit by real estate or banking crises. However,
their economies suffer from relatively rigid labour
and product markets that put a strain on their inter-
national competitiveness. Their exports are also
much less oriented toward emerging market coun-
tries than, say, those of Germany or Finland, and
thus they have benefited to a much lesser extent from
the strong performance in these countries.
A similar picture emerges when looking at the bal-
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a) Annualised quarterly growth.
Source: Eurostat, last accessed on 14 January 2011.
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Drop and recovery in GDP in European countries
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Red:       euro area countries
Orange: fixed exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro
Green:   flexible exchange rates
Source: Eurostat, last accessed on 19 January 2011.
a) The end of a white bar shows the drop in GDP from its peak in 2008 to its trough during the crisis. A coloured
bar compares GDP in the third quarter of 2010 to its pre-crisis peak in 2008. Therefore, the size of the white bar
indicates how much of the fall in GDP has so far been made up for.
Figure 1.13the imbalances faced within both the euro area and
the European Union. In particular, most of the north-
ern European countries are running a substantial
trade surplus against the rest of the world. After a
short reduction during the peak of the financial crisis,
the surplus has stabilised again at almost 2 percent of
EU GDP (see Figure 1.14). The reduction in the trade
deficit in both the GIPS countries and the central and
eastern European member states has been much
stronger, or even – in the latter case – translated into
a small surplus. Nevertheless, due to increased deficits
in France, Italy and the United Kingdom the overall
external balance of the European Union has returned
to pre-crisis levels. 
Instead of viewing the trade balance as a result of the
difference between exports and imports, it is just as
valid to take a financial flows perspective and regard
it as the difference between domestic savings and
domestic investment, i.e. the net capital outflow.
Figure 1.15 shows, for selected European countries,
the determinants of these net capital outflows (sur-
plus) or inflows (deficit). In most of the countries cur-
rently in distress, the corrections are largely taking
place via reduced domestic investment activities. As
national savings include both private and public sav-
ings, it is to be expected that the resilience of the sav-
ings rates is largely due to increased government
deficits. The austerity programmes in these countries
mainly decided during the summer of 2010 cannot
already be reflected in the data available, which end
with the third quarter of last year. The only exception
appears to be Portugal, where we saw a marked
increase in the national savings rate already in the
third quarter of last year.
The economic recovery led to a
stabilisation of the labour mar-
ket. The unemployment rate in
the euro area has remained stable
at around 10 percent since
October 2009 (see Figure 1.10),
reaching 10.1 percent in No-
vember last year. However,
labour markets are quite hetero-
geneous across Europe. In coun-
tries with more flexible working
hour arrangements and where
wage cuts have taken place, job
losses remained relatively con-
tained. In Germany, Finland and
the Netherlands, the unemploy-
ment rates have actually declined
during the past few months. In
Spain and Ireland, however, the collapse of the real
estate sector led to a dramatic increase in the unem-
ployment rates, reaching in November 2010, 20.6 and
13.9 percent, respectively.
After falling inflation rates during the crisis, inflation,
measured by the year-on-year change in the har-
monised index of consumer prices (HICP), started to
pick up again in November 2009. In November last
year, it was back at 2.3 percent in the European Union
(see Figure 1.16). Crucial to this development were
the upward movements in energy and raw material
prices since mid-2009. Correcting for energy and
unprocessed food price changes, the resulting core
inflation rate bottomed out in April last year at
1.3 percent. The moderate price developments reflect
the still rather weak domestic demand and the gener-
al underutilisation of machines and equipment in the
industrial and construction sectors. The core inflation
rate reached 1.6 percent in October. National har-
monised inflation rates ranged from above 5 percent
in Greece and just over 3 percent in Belgium and
Cyprus, to –0.8 percent in Ireland. Tax increases in
Greece, Portugal and Spain led to these temporary
hikes of inflation. Excluding these effects, average
price dynamics in these countries remain well below
the European average, indicating that their price com-
petitiveness has tended to improve.
In Germany, the upswing continued throughout last
year. After a record output growth rate in spring – it
reached its highest level since unification of 9.5 per-
cent on an annualised basis in the second quarter –
the pace slowed down. GDP expanded by an annu-
alised rate of 2.8 percent in the third quarter, leading
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to an annualised rate of 4.8 per-
cent during the first three quar-
ters of 2010. After having been at
the tail of the growth distribution
in Europe for many years, the
German economy is now making
above-average contributions to
EU growth. 
Besides benefiting strongly from
the uplift in world trade, a con-
siderable part of the impulses
were of domestic origin. In
addition to the strong impulses
from the inventory cycle during
the first half of the year, invest-
ment dynamics were spurred by
historically low interest rates
throughout the year. As in-
vestors presently assess the risk
of investments abroad substan-
tially higher than before the
financial crisis, investment
opportunities in Germany have
become more attractive. To-
gether with a high amount of
liquidity in the system, credit
conditions have, as a conse-
quence, relaxed in Germany.
Equipment investment managed
to expand strongly throughout
the year. However, residential
and public infrastructure invest-
ments were able to contribute to
the strong growth of the second
quarter, largely due to catching-
up effects.
After entering a recessionary
phase at the end of 2009, the
largest demand component, pri-
vate consumption, gained mo-
mentum throughout last year. In
the first three quarters of 2010 it
increased at an average annu-
alised rate of 1.6 percent and
thus outpaced the mean growth
rate of consumption observed in
the decade before. Public con-
sumption, although volatile
throughout the year, con-
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Figure 1.16These domestic developments were supported by the
wage restraint of the past ten years that improved
German price competitiveness, lending further sup-
port to its strong export sector. Except for the first
quarter of last year, in which extraordinary develop-
ments registered at the end of 2009 were corrected,
exports increased at a higher pace than imports. 
In the wake of the upswing, labour market conditions
improved substantially. Since the first quarter of 2008,
the trough in the German business cycle, the number
of employed persons in Germany has increased by
around 300,000. The number of unemployed declined
throughout 2010. The unemployment rate fell by
1 percentage point since its peak in June 2009 to
6.7 percent in November 2010.
Compared to other major European countries,
France was hit to a much smaller extent by the eco-
nomic and financial crisis. This is mainly due to the
French economy’s relatively low degree of openness
that shielded it from the consequences of the sharp
contraction of world trade during the winter of
2008/2009. Accordingly, the counter movement dur-
ing the second half of 2009 and the first half of
2010 were considerably more moderate than in
Germany, for example. France did not benefit as
much from the strong revival of the world economy
and in particular the emerging markets. The French
export sector is less well-positioned than Germany’s
in the dynamic emerging economies of East Asia
and Latin America.
For the past seven quarters, the French economy has
nevertheless been going through a recovery phase.
Aggregate production increased by an annualised
1.4 percent in the third quarter of 2010, after 2.7 per-
cent in the second quarter. Supported by currently low
interest rates and still positive impulses coming from
fiscal stimulus programmes, all components of
domestic demand continued to contribute positively
to growth in the third quarter. Private consumption
increased by 2.3 percent and continued the recovery
that began at the end of 2009. 
The abolition of local business taxes supported pri-
vate investment, in particular for machinery and
equipment. Construction investment, on the other
hand, continued to decline. For the second consecu-
tive year, inventory investment gave a strong boost to
economic growth. In contrast, and despite double-
digit export growth, the foreign trade contribution
was again negative, as imports grew much faster than
exports. The economic recovery helped to stop the cri-
sis-induced rise in the unemployment rate. Since the
beginning of last year it has been stable at around
9.8 percent (see Table 1.A.2 in Appendix 1.A).
In the United Kingdom, GDP grew again relatively
strongly in the third quarter of last year at an annu-
alised 3.1 percent. The largest contribution was deliv-
ered by gross fixed capital formation, while private
consumption grew at a lower rate than in the previous
quarter. Government consumption and foreign trade
– despite the continued weakness of the pound – even
made a slightly negative contribution to growth. 
In the real estate market, the austerity package adopt-
ed by the government for the years to come has
already cast its shadow. After house prices had signif-
icantly recovered since mid-2009, they have – despite
still existing tax breaks for home purchases – fallen
again during the second half of 2010. The uncertain
macroeconomic developments and the upcoming
cost-cutting programme of the government have put
potential buyers in a wait-and-see mode. In addition,
the already restrictive credit conditions have tightened
further in the third quarter.
Leading indicators give no cause for an optimistic pic-
ture of development this winter. While sentiment
increased in the manufacturing sector last December,
it fell markedly in the service sector, which is of major
importance for the British economy. Furthermore,
consumer confidence dropped in December as well as,
in October, industrial production. Together with
unusual weather conditions this even caused a drop in
GDP in the fourth quarter  of 2010. In particular the
construction sector was hit by the strong snowfalls in
December. The increased VAT at the start of this year
did not bring forward enough demand to compensate
for  this. Overall GDP is expected to have increased by
1.4 percent last year.
The economic recovery in Italy suffered a set-back
during the third quarter of last year. GDP only grew
by an annualised 0.7 percent, after having reached 1.6
and 1.9 percent in the first two quarters, respectively.
Positive impulses primarily stem from exports and
private investment in machinery and equipment.
Although the products it exports compete with those
of emerging markets, Italy managed to benefit – albeit
more moderately than Germany, for example – from
the revival in world trade. The low interest rate cou-
pled with reduced uncertainty allowed investment in
machinery and equipment to grow at around 8 per-
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cent last year. Construction investment declined fur-
ther. Hardly any impulses were provided by private
consumption. Weak growth in disposable income and
consolidation efforts of the Italian government made
consumption basically stagnate in the course of the
year. 
Despite only moderate growth, the situation in the
Italian labour market is relatively stable. This can be
attributed primarily to the government’s short-time
working programmes. Although the unemployment
rate rose to 8.7 percent in November 2010, it is only
about 2 percentage points above levels seen shortly
before the crisis. Due to higher energy prices, the rise
in consumer prices has accelerated slightly in October
2010, having reached 2 percent. 
Although  Spain officially came out of recession in
early 2010, its economy hardly grew during the year.
After GDP expanded by only an annualised 0.4 and
1.1 percent in the first and second quarters of 2010, it
stagnated in the third quarter. This renewed econom-
ic slowdown is primarily due to a strong decline in
domestic demand, in particular private consumption
and private investment. 
Consumer spending experienced the expected back-
lash to the expansion in the second quarter, which was
caused by advanced purchases in anticipation of the
VAT increase that took effect in July. Weak investment
activities are a direct consequence of the continuing
consolidation in the construction sector. Foreign
trade provided a strong positive impulse. Although
exports only increased by an annualised 0.3 percent,
imports dropped by close to an annualised 20 percent
in the third quarter of 2010. The inventory cycle still
managed to contribute positively to growth through-
out last year.
The situation in the Spanish labour market contin-
ued to deteriorate further during the year. The
unemployment rate peaked at 20.7 percent in
October last year and is by far the highest of all
euro-area member countries.2 Since the start of the
crisis, the unemployment rate has risen by more than
12 percentage points. Both due to the VAT increase
and a base effect resulting from deflationary tenden-
cies in 2009, inflation was relatively high at the end
of last year. It reached 2.3 percent in October 2010.
The public deficit is expected to have slightly
decreased to 9.3 percent in 2010 (as compared to
11.1 percent in 2009). Albeit still well below the
European average, the government debt-to-GDP
ratio will have increased to around 64 percent by the
end of last year. 
The rapid increase in public debt and the continuing
economic weakness in the autumn of 2010 raised
doubts about the solvency of the Spanish state. This is
reflected in a rising risk premium on Spanish govern-
ment bonds, especially as compared to German gov-
ernment bonds. The promises made by China early
this year to buy Spanish government bonds – after
having already done so in the cases of Greece and
Portugal – did not appear to have a lasting effect on
Spanish yields. Though China has not specified the
size of its investment in Spain, the Spanish media
reports suggest it could far exceed the investments
already made in Greek and Portuguese debt. 
In  Greece, the recession has deepened significantly.
GDP shrank by more than 4 percent last year. This
was accompanied by expenditure- and revenue-side
consolidation measures of the government. Despite
the severity of the economic downturn, these mea-
sures already had a noticeable effect on the fiscal bud-
get balance. The fiscal stimulus, as measured by the
change in the primary deficit, reached in 2010 
–6.7 percent of 2007 GDP levels. A significant pro-
portion of consolidation consists of an increase in
excise taxes. VAT was raised in several steps by a total
of 5 percentage points to currently 23 percent.
Accordingly, consumer prices rose sharply. Excluding
these tax effects, prices almost stagnated. Together
with the simultaneously implemented structural
reforms, this suggests an improvement in price com-
petitiveness in the coming years.
After the GDP in Ireland rose for the first time since
the end of 2007 during the first quarter of last year, it
turned negative again afterwards. In particular, pri-
vate and public consumption declined. The spreads
on Irish government bonds rose sharply during the
year. Although the Irish government pursued a con-
solidation strategy, it had to spend considerable
amounts of resources to rescue its banking sector and
to compensate for write-downs of guarantees made
earlier. As a consequence, the fiscal deficit is expected
to be over 30 percent of GDP in 2010. In relation to
its GDP, Ireland is bearing the greatest burden of the
banking crisis in Europe. 
In  Portugal, the economy presented itself relatively
strongly in the first quarter of last year. Subsequently
2 Within the European Union only Latvia with an average unem-
ployment rate of 20.9 percent in 2010 shows a worse performance. it reduced its pace again. The increase during the first
half of the year resulted from a rise in domestic
demand. After the budget deficit amounted to 9.3 per-
cent of GDP in 2009, it fell to about 7.3 percent last
year. Most of this reduction took place during the
second half of the year, after the risk premiums on
Portuguese government bonds rose dramatically. In
response, the government decided in May to raise
value added, income and corporate taxes. Sub-
sequently, the inflation rate rose. For the year 2010
GDP is expected to have grown by 1.7 percent.
In Central and Eastern Europe, the economic recovery
that began in the second half of 2009 has stabilised.
Nevertheless, the picture remains mixed. In Poland,
where the economy did not go into recession during
the financial crisis, economic growth increased its
pace and reached 3.8 percent last year. Meanwhile,
production levels in other countries of the region that
did experience severe drops in economic activity are
now also clearly pointing upward. In Slovakia and the
Czech Republic, the recovery of the car industry
became apparent. In the Baltic States, where in the
wake of the financial crisis particularly drastic drops
in economic activity had occurred, the recession also
came to an end last year. In the case of Estonia, sound
public finances and the decision to adopt the euro at
the start of this year built up investor and consumer
confidence, which supported the economic recovery.
On the other hand, there are also countries where the
economic recovery has not yet materialised.
Production stagnated in Bulgaria, while in Romania
and Latvia it continued to decline.
Impulses came first, above all, from an increase in
demand from abroad. In countries with flexible
exchange rates, a depreciating currency seemed sup-
portive. Later on also the competitive position of
those countries and the region that had pegged their
currencies to the euro improved. The weak euro sup-
ported their trade relationship with countries outside
Europe, in particular Asia and Latin America. In
Poland domestic demand also increased substantial-
ly. However, in other countries it picked up only
slowly.
After a sharp decline in 2009 as compared to the years
before, the inflation rate initially increased somewhat
last year. However, with the exception of Hungary
and Romania, the observed levels remain historically
low. As a consequence, there are no signs yet that
those countries that follow an inflation target will
soon increase their interest rates. After budget deficits
had expanded strongly during the crisis, in most coun-
tries significant steps towards consolidation were
taken last year. Except for Estonia, which wanted to
make sure that it could enter the euro area, fiscal
deficits nevertheless exceeded 3 percent of GDP last
year.
1.3 Fiscal and monetary policy in Europe
1.3.1 Fiscal policy
Economic and political discussion in Europe last year
centred on the sovereign debt crisis. Concerns regard-
ing the solvency of countries like Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Spain, have brought
the need for fiscal restructuring of the national
finances to the fore. As a consequence, throughout the
year problems associated with government bonds
escalated time and time again. 
The cyclically-related public spending increase and
tax revenue shortfalls together with the economic
stimulus packages implemented in 2009 led to a dra-
matic deterioration in public finances in most
European countries. The consolidated budget balance
of the European Union rose to –6.8 percent of GDP
in 2009 and is likely to have remained there last year
(see Table 1.2). Accordingly, the public debt reached a
record high of nearly 79.1 percent of economic out-
put last year. 
Given the difficulty of coming up with detailed, but
still comparable, estimates of fiscal impulses and aus-
terity measures induced by the public sector, we prefer
the use of a relatively straightforward summary mea-
sure: the change in the primary deficit of the general
government relative to a pre-crisis measure of the eco-
nomic size of a country, i.e. its GDP in 2007.3 It
includes both discretionary measures taken by the
general government as well as the automatic stabilis-
ers, both during the expansionary and consolidation
phase.
Last year stimulus measures began to be gradually
reduced and thereby initiated the consolidation of
government finances in Europe. Nevertheless, in
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3 As it is generally believed that changes in interest payments by the
government do not have a strong impact on the economy and are not
intended as such, the primary balance – which excludes these – is
likely to be a better measure than the change in the fiscal balance per
se. Note, however, that increased interest payments can have a sub-
stantial effect on government debt levels and therefore are important
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countries such as Austria, Denmark, Germany,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, fiscal policy con-
tinued to be expansionary in
2010 (see Figure 1.17). The
countries of the European pe-
riphery (Greece, Ireland Por-
tugal and Spain) together with
Belgium and the United King-
dom, however, were forced to
take sharp austerity measures in
the summer of 2010 in response
to doubts about their solvency
and sharply rising refinancing
costs.4 Accordingly, domestic demand was greatly
attenuated in these countries. 





1999–2007 2008 2009 2010  1999–2007 2008 2009 2010 
Germany  63.3 66.3 73.4 75.7 –2.1  0.1 –3.0 –3.7 
France  61.5 67.5 78.1 83.0 –2.6 –3.3 –7.5 –7.7 
Italy  106.8 106.3 116.0 118.9  –2.7  –2.7  –5.3  –5.0 
Spain  49.2 39.8 53.2 64.4  0.1 –4.2  –11.1 –9.3 
Netherlands  51.7 58.2 60.8 64.8 –0.5  0.6 –5.4 –5.8 
Belgium 98.8 89.6 96.2 98.6 –0.4 –1.3 –6.0 –4.8 
Austria  64.8 62.5 67.5 70.4 –1.6 –0.5 –3.5 –4.3 
Greece  101.2  110.3  126.8  140.2 –5.2 –9.4  –15.4 –9.6 
Ireland  32.4 44.3 65.5 97.4  1.6 –7.3  –14.4  –32.3 
Finland  42.1 34.1 43.8 49.0  3.8  4.2 –2.5 –3.1 
Portugal 55.9 65.3 76.1 82.8 –3.6 –2.9 –9.3 –7.3 
Slovakia  41.0 27.8 35.4 42.1 –5.3 –2.1 –7.9 –8.2 
Slovenia  26.7 22.5 35.4 40.7 –2.3 –1.8 –5.8 –5.8 
Luxembourg  6.3 13.6 14.5 18.2  2.5  3.0 –0.7 –1.8 
Estonia  5.0 4.6 7.2 8.0 0.7  –2.8  –1.7  –1.0 
Cyprus  60.9 48.3 58.0 62.2 –2.7  0.9  6.0 –5.9 
Malta 63.5 63.1 68.6 70.4 –5.4 –4.8 –3.8 –4.2 
Euro  area  68.4 69.7 79.1 84.1 –1.8 –2.0 –6.3 –6.3 
United  Kingdom 41.1 52.1 68.2 77.8 –1.4 –5.0  –11.4  –10.5 
Sweden  51.2 38.2 41.9 39.9  1.4  2.2 –0.9 –0.9 
Denmark  44.3 34.1 41.5 44.9  2.5  3.2 –2.7 –5.1 
Poland  43.2 47.1 50.9 55.5 –4.1 –3.7 –7.2 –7.9 
Czech  Republic 26.2 30.0 35.3 40.0 –4.0 –2.7 –5.8 –5.2 
Hungary  59.3 72.3 78.4 78.5 –6.3 –3.7 –4.4 –3.8 
Romania  19.5 13.4 23.9 30.4 –2.6 –5.7 –8.6 –7.3 
Lithuania  20.6 15.6 29.5 37.4 –1.8 –3.3 –9.2 –8.4 
Bulgaria 46.2 13.7 14.7 18.2  0.5  1.7 –4.7 –3.8 
Latvia 12.7 19.7 36.7 45.7 –1.6 –4.2  –10.2 –7.7 
EU27  61.2 61.8 74.0 79.1 –1.7 –2.3  –  6.8 –6.8 
a) As a percentage of gross domestic product; definitions according to the Maastricht Treaty. For Slovenia, the euro
area and the EU27 the data on gross debt start in 2001.
Source: European Commission, Directorate General ECFIN, Economic and Financial Affairs, general government data,
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Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN, General Government Data, Autumn 2010, Tables 54A and 56A.
Figure 1.17
4 As Figure 1.17 shows, Ireland is a special
case. By rescuing its banking sector, the
Irish government experienced a huge
increase in its deficits, substantially reduc-
ing the willingness of financial markets to
buy Irish government bonds, which subse-
quently forced Ireland to be the first coun-
try to draw on the European Financial
Stability Facility. As these bailout costs are
(except for the induced interest payments
and amortisation) one-off, an automatic,
strong correction will be seen this year.An important reason for the
large union-wide deficit last year
is the high level of spending on
unemployment benefits. This
year, without exception, all coun-
tries will consolidate their public
finances and thereby take a
restrictive fiscal policy stance.
The negative effect on public
spending and disposable income
will significantly slow down the
recovery in domestic demand.
Particularly exposed to the nega-
tive momentum will be those
economies that are perceived to
be on the brink of insolvency, i.e.
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain. All in all, the induced sav-
ing efforts will reduce the overall deficit in the
European Union to 5.1 percent of GDP this year (see
Table 1.A.3 in Appendix 1.A).
Part of the increase in deficits in recent years has been
due to the automatic stabilisers built into our systems,
such as the progressive tax system and unemployment
and welfare benefits that depend upon economic con-
ditions. Another part has been due to fiscal stimulus
packages that were intended to be “timely”, “target-
ed” and “temporary”.5 If these rules had been fol-
lowed, then the only increase in structural budget
deficits we would have seen would have been due to
increased interest payments caused by the jump in
government debt associated with the stimulus mea-
sures. Although not negligible, the need for substan-
tial austerity programmes would have been circum-
vented. Unfortunately, it is basically impossible to
adequately measure structural budget balances.
Experience tells us that we can produce rough guides
that still depend – at least when cycles are as pro-
nounced as they have been in the last few years – on
short-term economic conditions. Keeping this caveat
in mind, Figure 1.18 shows estimates of structural
deficits in the four large economic blocks in the world.
The sharp increase during the crisis year 2009 is
unmistakable. Also the predicted decline next year is
clearly visible in the United States, the United
Kingdom and the euro area. Only in Japan are there
no signs of a reduction in structural deficits. At best it
has managed to stabilise its structural deficits at the
alleviated levels seen earlier this century.
After the general government budget in Germany was
nearly balanced in 2007 and 2008, the economic crisis
in 2009 led to a deficit of 3 percent of GDP. Although
the automatic stabilizers, as a result of the economic
recovery, aided the consolidation of the state budget
significantly, the deficit-to-GDP ratio is expected to
have risen again to 3.7 percent last year. This was
largely caused by the prevailing economic stimulus
packages that led to declines in income and property
taxes. Due to the economic upswing, general govern-
ment expenditure increased moderately in 2010.
Unemployment and other monetary benefits only
rose slightly. The acquisition of assets and liabilities of
Hypo Real Estate have led to an increase in wealth
transfer. On the other hand, Germany benefited from
very low interest rates. Despite the increase in govern-
ment debt, it is likely that government interest expens-
es declined again last year.
This year, fiscal policy in Germany will turn restric-
tive. The consolidation efforts are supported by the
working of automatic stabilizers in the context of the
on-going economic upswing. The budget deficit may
fall back to about 2.5 percent of GDP this year.
Somewhat more than half of this improvement is like-
ly to be of a structural nature. Government revenues
will be driven here by opposing forces, which will
induce the overall tax rate and the share of social
security contributions to GDP to remain largely sta-
ble. The consolidation will mainly be achieved on the
expenditure side. Although growth rates are much
lower than in previous years, government consump-





















Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 88, December 2010.





5 The timely principle says governments apply their stimulus as early
in the downturn as possible. The targeted principle says the stimulus
should go to areas where the crisis hits the hardest and which are
most likely to subsequently spend a large share of the stimulus
means. Finally, the temporary principle says everything governments
do must be a one-off (even if spread over a few years) so that it leaves
no impediment to getting the budget back in line once the economy
is out of recession.EEAG Report 2011 35
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tion will nevertheless continue to develop relatively
strongly. The quantitatively most important consoli-
dation effort is achieved by reducing social security
benefits. Unemployment expenditures will decrease
due to the favourable development of the labour mar-
ket. The ending of specific investment packages will
cause government investment to fall slightly this year.
Despite further rising debt levels, interest expendi-
tures are expected to rise only slightly. It is assumed
that Germany will maintain its privileged financing
conditions.
The government debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to
change only marginally this year. However, there is
large uncertainty with respect to the expected increase
in debt caused by the rescue packages for distressed
EU countries. As part of the European Financial
Stability Facility, Germany has committed to a maxi-
mum aggregate liability of almost 150 billion euros.
These figures are not included in this forecast.
In  France, an important step towards reducing the
structural government deficit was taken in October
2010 with the decision to increase the minimum retire-
ment age from 60 to 62 years. Already this year, this
reform will be beneficial to the debt dynamics of the
country and provide a positive signal to financial mar-
kets. The government deficit in 2010 will turn out to
have been 7.7 percent of GDP. It is projected to fall
back to 6.3 percent this year. Accordingly, the govern-
ment debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to rise from
83 percent in 2010 to close to 87 percent this year. The
main risks to the economic recovery of France are
again the flaring up of turmoil on the European gov-
ernment bond market, which would then be reflected
in a rise in risk premiums for securities from Euro-
pean core countries. In the case of France, given that
a large fraction (17.7 percent) of the outstanding debt
expires this year, such a scenario would have substan-
tial consequences for its public finances.
Also in the United Kingdom fiscal consolidation is
underway. Since the United Kingdom will have had
the largest deficit-to-GDP ratio in Europe – except for
Ireland – last year, the fiscal tightening is highly nec-
essary and will have to be substantial in nature.
According to the Spending Review, published at the
end of October last year, it is the intention of the gov-
ernment to achieve a structurally balanced budget by
the end of 2016. 
Tax increases, including higher social security con-
tributions and a hike in the VAT rate are the first
significant contributions to this. Since January this
year, VAT has been raised by 2.5 percentage points
and the time restriction on the bank levy introduced
in early 2010 has been abolished. Moreover, contri-
butions to public pension schemes will be increased,
the child allowance for high-income earners will be
abolished and social benefits capped at the house-
hold level. 
Most of the consolidation will, however, take place on
the expenditure side. The austerity programme
includes savings of 81 billion pounds (97 billion
euros) across all departments, except health and
development aid, up to fiscal 2014/2015. Public sector
wages will be frozen for two years and significant falls
in government investment, consumption and transfers
are envisaged. As a result, fiscal headwinds are set to
strengthen – the negative fiscal impulse this year will
be around 2 percent of GDP. The fiscal deficit is pro-
jected to fall to 8.6 percent of GDP this year. 
Even before the recession started in 2008, Italy had –
by European standards – a high government debt bur-
den of over 100 percent of GDP to deal with. During
the crisis the Italian government therefore decided
against comprehensive economic stimulus measures.
This explains why the government deficit situation
saw a relatively small increase from 2.7 percent in
2008 to around 5 percent last year (see Table 1.2) and
Italian bonds have performed relatively well as com-
pared to those of other southern European countries.
The Italian government has announced a further
tightened fiscal policy for the years to come. Measures
include a freeze of public-sector wages and significant
cuts in transfers to local governments. As a conse-
quence the fiscal deficit is scheduled to be reduced to
4.3 percent of GDP in 2011. Government debt is
expected to peak at around 120 percent of GDP this
year. 
Fiscal policy in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
The global financial crisis and the ensuing economic
collapse in 2009 resulted in a sharp deterioration of
public budgets in the countries of the European
periphery that turned out to be much more dramatic
than in the core of Europe. A series of country-spe-
cific and common factors were decisive for this devel-
opment. Thus, the collapse of real estate markets in
Ireland and Spain led to a more than doubling of the
respective unemployment rates and to severe shocks
to the banking sector. The government budget situa-
tion of Greece was already unsustainable before thecrisis. Also Portugal already recorded deficits that
were significantly higher than in most other European
countries. Rigid labour markets in Greece, Portugal
and Spain prevented a swift and efficient adaptation
to changing conditions. Furthermore, the export sec-
tors of Greece, Portugal and Spain are not well-posi-
tioned on the dynamic markets in East Asia and face
strong competition from emerging countries.
This combination of a quickly deteriorating debt
position and structural weaknesses created doubts
about the sustainability of government debt in these
peripheral countries. As a result, risk premiums on
their government bonds skyrocketed. Greece in par-
ticular was affected. The high returns demanded by
financial markets made it almost impossible for the
country to meet its current financing needs, and drove
it to the brink of insolvency (see Box 1.1). This was
averted by establishing a rescue fund for Greece.
However, the rescue package could only calm finan-
cial markets temporarily. The risk premiums rose
again in June 2010 and forced Ireland, Portugal and
Spain to adopt major consolidation measures as well.
The austerity plans are intended to bring back the
public finances of the affected countries to a sustain-
able path. In Spain and Portugal, profound structural
labour market reforms have also been adopted. 
Despite these consolidation efforts, savings targets
that were set in spring last year will not be achieved in
most of these countries. An important reason for this
is that the negative effects on economic growth have
turned out to be stronger than expected. 
In Greece, the deficit was scheduled to be reduced by
seven percentage points (from 15.4 percent of GDP in
2009 – using current data – to 8.1 percent of GDP in
2010).6 Despite tax increases and drastic cuts in pub-
lic services, this target will be missed by more than
1 percentage point. Last year’s deficit is currently
expected to equal 9.6 percent of GDP. Especially rev-
enues have turned out to be lower than projected. 
The government budget of Ireland was strongly
affected by the rescuing cost of its ailing banking sys-
tem in autumn last year. Accordingly, the public
deficit probably reached 32.3 percent of GDP last
year, while government debt rose to 97.4 percent of
GDP. Without bailout costs, the deficit- and debt-to-
GDP ratios would have been around 12 and 78 per-
cent, i.e. much lower. 
To avoid a further increase in uncertainty and
renewed turmoil on European bond markets, the gov-
ernment in Dublin agreed to a rescue package by the
European community, the European Commission and
the IMF, by which Ireland is able to draw upon the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). To
achieve the savings targets for the years to come,
Ireland had to sharpen its original consolidation plan
considerably. In November 2010, additional savings of
10 percent of GDP were decided on. The largest share
will come this year, in which nearly 3.7 percent of
GDP will have to be saved. Around 75 percent of the
cuts will be made on the expenditure side. This con-
cerns in particular public investment, many social
benefits and the number of civil servants. However,
the deficit targets are based on the growth forecasts of
the Irish government, which appear to be quite opti-
mistic. The additional cost-cutting efforts will weigh
heavily on the economy and slow down its recovery
significantly. The government deficit is expected to
decline in 2011 to 10.3 percent of GDP, while govern-
ment debt is likely to grow to nearly 107 percent of
GDP.
Although Portugal was not hit by a real estate crisis
and its deficit developed less dramatically than in
other European periphery countries, it nonetheless
had already accumulated a large public debt before
the recession. Together with structural problems of
its economy, this led to a loss of confidence in finan-
cial markets. As a result, refinancing costs increased
sharply and forced the government in Lisbon to
adopt an austerity package in March. However, not
least because of the reluctance with which certain
consolidation measures were addressed, this did not
calm the financial markets. To counteract the ongo-
ing increase in the country’s risk premium, the
Portuguese government presented a new and far
more ambitious consolidation plan in May.
According to this plan, a public deficit of 7.3 percent
of GDP was envisaged for 2010, instead of the origi-
nally planned 8.3 percent. The deficit target for 2011
was also significantly adjusted downwards: from
6.6 percent to 4.6 percent of GDP. The budget for
this year, which was adopted last November, includ-
ed almost all measures listed in this revised consoli-
dation plan. It is scheduled to cut spending and
increase revenues by 2.2 and 1.2 percent of GDP,
respectively. Various social benefits and wages in the
public sector will be reduced and pensions frozen. At
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6 When the bailout package was agreed upon in May 2010, the bud-
get deficit for 2009 was thought to be 13.6 percent. Eurostat revised
this figure to 15.4 percent November last year. Hence, the targeted
reduction in May was supposed to lead to a deficit of 6.6 percent last
year.EEAG Report 2011 37
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the same time, VAT has been raised again by two per-
centage points and income tax deductions are to be
reduced. However, the GDP forecast of 0.2 percent
growth for 2011 published by the Portuguese govern-
ment seems to be too optimistic. A decline in GDP of
0.3 percent appears more likely. If the government
continues to adhere to its predetermined saving tar-
get, then it is to be expected that further consolida-
tion measures will have to be taken. The budget
deficit will then fall from 7.3 percent to 4.9 percent of
GDP this year. Gross debt is likely to reach almost
89 percent of GDP this year.
Box 1.1  
Solvency of the GIPS countries
1)
Despite the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) – a special purpose vehicle for
providing financial assistance to countries threatened by insolvency – in spring 2010, concerns of investors about
possible insolvencies of some, if not of all, peripheral countries continued to increase. The main reason for
persisting turbulences on financial markets is the increasing levels of sovereign debt combined with a lack of 
economic dynamics. Although some of the involved countries did face liquidity problems, this does not
necessarily imply that these countries are actually insolvent. In the following we examine the conditions under 
which these countries are in fact exposed to the threat of insolvency.
The sustainability of public finances of a country crucially depends on the long-term relationship between
nominal debt growth and the average nominal interest rate on government bonds. A country is solvent if, and only 
if, the former is lower than the latter. Intuitively, this condition of solvency states that the present value of all
future public revenues needs to be greater or equal to the sum of the present value of all future primary public
expenditures and the currently existing debt. In other words, the present value of all future primary surpluses must
not fall short of the current level of public debt.
To determine the long-run dynamics of government debt in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (the GIPS
countries), we construct a time path for nominal GDP and proceed similarly for the primary deficit.
2) In addition
we make assumptions about the long-term development of nominal interest rates on government bonds. For 2010 
and 2011 the EEAG forecasts for real GDP, the GDP deflators and the budget deficits for the four countries are 
taken as a basis. Beginning from 2012 the growth rates of real GDP and the GDP deflators are both assumed to
gradually converge towards 2 percent. This value equals what can be considered the EU-wide potential growth
rate and the long-term inflation target of the ECB. Thus, after 2020, nominal GDP is assumed to increase annually
by 4 percent in each of these countries. Spain already attains its potential growth rate in 2014; for both Greece and
Ireland this is the case in 2015. By contrast, Portugal goes through a period of real growth rates of around 
1.5 percent, before achieving its potential in 2030. The overall deficits in 2012, 2013 and 2014 are set to the target
values specified by the Stability and Growth Pact. Accordingly, in Portugal and Spain the overall deficit-to-GDP
ratio is expected to already reach the Maastricht level of 3 percent in 2013, whereas Greece and Ireland are
assumed to achieve this goal one year later. By assumption, all four countries maintain this level from 2014 
onwards. To determine each country’s current need for refinancing, figures on public debt levels in 2010 are
broken down by bond categories. For new debt an interest rate of 5 percent is assumed.
Due to the assumed long-run symmetry, the primary surpluses of these countries all converge to 0.75 percent of
GDP. Hence, savings are in the long run identical across these countries. However, in the medium run they differ.
Portugal has to realize an annual primary surplus of about 3.5 percent between 2015 and 2030, which stands in
strong contrast to the average primary surplus of 0.2 percent achieved in the years 1992 to 2006. Also Greece will
have to save notably more than it did in the decade preceding the crisis. While its primary surplus averaged
1.4 percent between 1992 and 2006, it will have to obtain an annual primary surplus of close to 3 percent during
the next two decades to comply with the 3 percent limit for the overall deficit. With an annual primary surplus of 
1.7 percent until 2030, Ireland needs slightly less severe saving efforts. In light of the average primary surplus of 
3.8 percent between 1992 and 2006 this appears feasible. Even less demanding are the saving needs in Spain. The 
country will have to obtain primary surpluses of less than 1 percent of GDP over the next 20 years. This is lower 
than its historical average of 1.2 percent. However, all these statements only hold true for this baseline scenario in
which only an interest rate of 5 percent has to be paid on newly incurred debt.
Also the growth rates of (nominal) government debt levels will, with the passage of time, become increasingly
similar. In the long-run, they will equal 4 percent in all countries. This value is strictly less than the assumed
5 percent average interest rate which countries have to pay on their new debt. Consequently, in the baseline 
scenario, all four countries are solvent: the countries will be able to generate sufficiently large primary surpluses 
to ensure that government debt will accumulate slowly enough to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio constant or even
have it decrease. This, however, is no guarantee that actual financing of new debt is assured. For that, we need
investors to be patient in so far that they tolerate a medium-term rise in government debt as long as long-term
prospects remain sustainable.
1) This box is based on Carstensen et al. (2010), pp. 24–9.
2)The primary deficit is the difference between the total deficit and the interest payments. Also in Spain, the government has made significant
consolidation efforts to counteract the loss of confi-
dence in financial markets. The government’s goal is
to reduce its deficit of 11.1 percent of GDP in 2009 to
first 6 percent in 2011 and subse-
quently 3 percent in 2013. To
achieve this, a comprehensive
austerity package was decided
upon in May last year. It includ-
ed a freeze of wages for civil ser-
vants and foremost massive cuts
in public investment spending.
Moreover, VAT was raised by
2 percentage points in mid-2010.
Although considerable progress
in consolidating public budgets
has been made, the Spanish gov-
ernment will fall short of its
objectives. Particularly due to the
spending cuts and an increase in
tax revenues, Spain was able to
reduce its public deficit signifi-
cantly last year. However, the
burden of rising unemployment
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However, the uncertainty about the long-term funding costs and the medium-term growth prospect of these
countries is enormous. As recent developments on European sovereign bond markets have shown, yields can
strongly fluctuate and also differ persistently across countries (see Figure 1.24). At the same time, medium-term
growth prospects are unclear. Growth in the years before the crisis can hardly serve as indication for future
growth. For these reasons, the following will explore alternatives in these two dimensions to test the solvency of
the four peripheral countries.
Figure 1.19 illustrates for which theoretically possible combinations of the long-term financing costs (horizontal
axis) and long-term real GDP growth rate (vertical axis) the public finance situation in these GIPS countries can
be considered sustainable. Combinations along the depicted line describe situations in which the previously
defined criteria for solvency are weakly satisfied. Combinations above the line allow a strictly sustainable 
financing of the public debt, while combinations below the line lead to insolvency. Thus a country can only
absorb higher financing costs if at the same time it is able to increase its long-term growth rate. Conversely,
higher growth allows for higher financing costs.
In the baseline scenario, in which financing costs were assumed to equal 5 percent and long-run growth to equal
2 percent, the public finances of all four countries are sustainable – assuming they will adhere to the Stability and
Growth Pact. However, the required growth rate increases rapidly with increasing financing costs. Consequently
an increase of the costs of borrowing from 5 to 6 percent does not endanger the countries’ solvencies if long-term
growth is able to reach 2.6 percent in Portugal, 3.3 percent in Spain, 4.2 percent in Greece and 4.4 percent in
Ireland, instead of the assumed 2 percent. While these growth rates are in a range that still might be considered
possible, although unlikely, an increase of the borrowing costs beyond 6 percent would especially bring Greece 
and Ireland, but also Spain, into a problematic situation; required long-run growth rates lie well beyond any values 
that appear realistic from today’s perspective. Only Portugal seems to be capable of absorbing financing costs of,
for instance, 8 percent.
Under current conditions, especially Greece and Ireland are unlikely to go back to the capital market without
implementing additional measures that go far beyond those demanded by the European Union so far. This is,
however, not implausible as both countries have lower tax and social security contribution ratios than e.g.
Germany. Hence, some scope for higher taxes and social security contributions exists. The situation is most
extreme in Ireland where the tax and social security contribution ratio is 11 percent below the German one. This
means that Ireland could sustain an additional public debt of 200 billion euros at the currently prevailing interest
rate if it had the tax and social security contribution ratio that Germany has. This sum is four times larger than the
estimated costs of recapitalizing the Irish banking sector.
3)
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and a weak economy continues
to be a drag on public finances.
The government deficit is expect-
ed to have fallen to 9.3 percent of
GDP last year and will be re-
duced further to 6.4 percent this
year. Consequently, the debt-to-
GDP ratio is expected to rise
from 53.2 percent in 2009 to
64.4 percent last year and
69.7 percent this year. The on-
going consolidation of savings
banks, which might imply addi-
tional financial means to go into
the bank rescue fund FROB,
poses a significant risk to public
finances in Spain.
1.3.2 Monetary conditions and financial markets
Monetary conditions
Compared to the pre-crisis situation, central banks
are now forced to keep an eye strongly focused on the
stability of the financial system. Although at first
glance the European sovereign debt crisis is about
illiquidity or potential insolvency of individual mem-
ber states, the interconnectedness in terms of cross-
holdings of sovereign debt within the European bank-
ing sector also makes it a concern of inner-euro-area
financial stability. Although progress has been made,
it is feared that the banking system is still not capi-
talised well enough to withstand a debt restructuring.
The underutilisation of resources in most economies
will keep inflationary pressures low, and although the
large amounts of liquidity provided by central banks
have raised fears that at some stage higher inflation
will be inevitable, medium-term inflation expecta-
tions, at least in the euro area, remain well anchored
below 2 percent.
For these reasons monetary policy has remained very
accommodative throughout 2010. The European
Central Bank (ECB) has maintained its low interest
rate policy and left the main refinancing rate at 1 per-
cent throughout 2010 (see Figure 1.20). Open market
operations were still carried out as fixed rate tenders
with unlimited allocation of funds. Hence, the ECB
kept on providing unlimited liquidity to the banking
sector. However, the demand for euro operations, in
particular with longer maturities, significantly de-
creased. As part of the Securities Markets Programme
initiated in May 2010 to address tensions in particular
securities markets, the ECB has so far bought govern-
ment bonds worth around 75 billion euros. The addi-
tional liquidity thereby supplied has been completely
neutralized by the simultaneous collection of fixed-
term deposits with a weekly maturity.
Especially during the first half of last year, money
market rates kept on indicating a limited functionali-
ty and associated segmentation of interbank markets.
Both the reference rate for short-term interest rates
(EURIBOR) and the effective overnight interest rate
(EONIA) remained well below the main refinancing
rate. However, since summer, these rates have been ris-
ing, but, relative to the main refinancing rate of the
ECB, are still at low levels.
Private credit growth remained moderate last year.
Only credit volumes of housing loans showed a steady
increase throughout the year (see Figure 1.21).
Consumer credit and loans to non-financial corpora-
tions, on the other hand, basically stagnated and com-
pared to the average of 2009 even fell slightly.
According to the ECB’s bank lending survey, banks
expect a stable net tightening of credit standards for
enterprises, a slight net easing of credit standards for
housing loans and a more sizeable net easing in con-
sumer credit.
The relatively stable interest rates on money markets
are also reflected in overall stagnating lending rates
for the non-financial sector (see Figure 1.22). Whereas
the interest rate on long-term loans managed to fall
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Figure 1.20interest rates on loans with short-
er maturities have started to pick
up somewhat and surpassed lev-
els seen early last year.
The sharp nominal and real
depreciation of the euro during
the first half of 2010 was only
partly reversed during summer
and autumn. During the winter
months the euro again lost value
against the dollar. Overall this
has further loosened monetary
conditions within the euro area
considerably (see Figure 1.23).
For the time-being the ECB will
leave the main refinancing rate at
its current level of 1 percent. By
no longer conducting open refi-
nancing operations using maturi-
ties beyond one month and mov-
ing away from fixed rate tenders
with full allotment probably in
April, it is scaling back its use of
non-standard monetary policy
measures. When this comes to a
stop in autumn, this will slowly
reverse the substantial increase in
narrowly defined concepts of
money that has been observed
since October 2008. As the eco-
nomic recovery in the euro area is
expected to gain some momen-
tum again in the course of the
year and beyond, it is likely that
the ECB will increase its key rates
by 25 basis points by the end of
this year. For this reason, money
and capital market interest rates
are expected to slowly increase
further. 
Bonds, stocks and foreign 
exchange markets
Since 2008, the European govern-
ment bond yields have moved sig-
nificantly apart. Initially, this
largely reflected a surge towards
safe assets. After spreads fell
somewhat during summer 2009,
those of Greece, Ireland, Portu-













a) These indexes of adjusted outstanding amounts are calculated according to I t = I t -1(1+F t/L t -1), where L stands 
for the outstanding nominal amount of credit and F the amount of transactions (credit granted). The transactions F 
are calculated from differences in outstanding amounts adjusted for reclassifications, other revaluations, exchange 
rate variations and other changes which do not arise from transactions (see European Central Bank 2010 for details).
Source: European Central Bank, last accessed on 29 January 2011.
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a) The MCI is calculated as a weighted average of real short-term interest rates (nominal rate minus core inflation 
rate HCPI) and the real effective exchange rate of the euro.
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gal and Spain started to increase sharply again in
spring last year (see Figure 1.24). The current high
interest rate spreads for the peripheral countries are
primarily due to an increase in their default probabil-
ities. With a spread between its government bond
yield and the German one of more than 900 basis
points, as it was in December last year, financial mar-
kets assume that Greece is likely in future to default
on its outstanding government bonds. 
After the funding problems of Greece had become
more and more pressing in April 2010 and a stand-
alone solution for Greece was found, the finance min-
isters of the euro-area member countries agreed in
May together with the IMF on the establishment of
an emergency fund, the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF). This facility amounts to up to
750 billion euros and is intended to restore confidence
in government bonds markets. Immediately thereafter,
the ECB adopted a programme to purchase govern-
ment bond in the secondary market, the so-called
Securities Markets Program (SMP). 
Although de jure compatible with the statutes of the
ECB, the SMP is not in line with the spirit of the
Maastricht Treaty, as it facilitates the financing of
budget deficits of countries in the euro area. Not only
does this jeopardise the independence of the ECB in
the future, the timing of its introduction has already
led to discussions about its independence today.
After Greece had to request financial assistance in
May last year, Ireland – due to largely political pres-
sure – was forced to be the first country to draw upon
the EFSF. The loans granted to
Ireland add up to about 85 billion
euros. As Ireland would have had
sufficient funding up to mid-
2011, it did not seek help itself.
However, the interconnectedness
of Irish and other European
banks led the European Union to
urge Ireland into the EFSF.
Given the increased yields on
Portuguese government bonds
and country risk spreads, it seems
only a matter of time before
Portugal will also be put under
the shield of the EFSF.
The size of the EFSF is clearly
sufficient to deal with liquidity
problems of these smaller econo-
mies. However, questions did arise as to whether the
wings of this facility are large enough to be also able
to offer sufficient shelter to larger economies if
deemed necessary. The spreads on government bonds
of Spain and Italy have increased significantly. If
financial markets do not have sufficient confidence in
the future fiscal course of – first of all – Spain, then
refinancing costs will become much more expensive in
the future. Hence, despite the support of Ireland, the
sovereign debt crisis in Europe is far from over. It will
be put to a test when Spain has to roll over part of his
debt in 2011. Also the recent decision by EU finance
ministers to introduce a new and permanent crisis
mechanism in case of government default by having
collective action clauses in future bonds was not real-
ly able to calm financial markets. The agreed terms
will only apply from 2013 onwards and it will pre-
sumably take another six to eight years until the
majority of the bonds will contain such clauses (see
Chapter 2).
Independent of this surge in risk premiums, long-
term government bond yields have started to
increase after reaching a trough in September/
October 2010. By the end of the year, the German
yield on government bonds with a maturity of
10 years had increased by close to 60 basis points.
Similar patterns can be observed for the United
States, the United Kingdom and the aggregate euro
area (see Figure 1.25). Albeit less pronounced,
Japanese yields moved in the same direction. The
average return on 10-year European corporate
bonds, since its trough in September, had increased



















Source: Datastream, last accessed on 19 January 2011.
Regional disparties w.r.t. government bond yields in the euro area
Differences between national government bond yields and German bond yield
Figure 1.24The financial crisis caused all
major stock markets to drop by
around 50 percent as compared
to their peaks in 2007. Troughs
were reached in early 2009 and
markets have since recovered to
different extents (see Figu-
re 1.26). After stock markets
experienced a substantial set-
back during summer last year,
they improved again. In the
United States and in the United
Kingdom, the end-of-year rally
allowed stock markets to fur-
ther steadily approach their pre-
crisis levels. In contrast, Japa-
nese and European markets
overall no more than stagnated
last year. 
The euro exchange rate against
the US dollar remains volatile.
Coming from levels around
1.50 US dollars in December
2009, the euro first depreciated to
below 1.20 in June last year to
then gain values of around
1.40 again in November (see
Figure 1.27). By the end of last
year, it returned to about 1.30 US
dollars. The weakening of the
euro especially during the first
half of last year was associated
with the flaming up of the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis. In a
historical perspective, however,
its value in both nominal and real
terms is still well-beyond levels
seen during the first years of this
century. 
From a somewhat longer per-
spective of 10 years, of the larg-
er currencies in the world, espe-
cially those of the United
Kingdom and the United States
appear to be relatively weak. As
a safe haven currency, the Ja-
panese yen has gained value
again during the crisis. Also dur-
ing the second half of last year it
strongly appreciated again
against its trading partners. The
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Chinese renminbi shows a steady
real increase in its value since
early 2005 (see Figure 1.28).
Within Europe, exchange rates
did not move in a synchronised
way. Although most of the
European countries that do not
have their exchange rates directly
linked to the euro saw an appreci-
ation vis-à-vis the euro last year,
this does not hold for all of them
(see Figure 1.29). Throughout the
year the currencies of Romania
and Hungary even depreciated
slightly. Especially Sweden,
which also reached its pre-crisis
GDP again, witnessed a strong
appreciation. The depreciation of
these countries against the euro
during the recession has helped
cushion the crisis in those
economies. Figure 1.13 shows
that the Baltic states – all having
their exchange rate fixed to the
euro – experienced the strongest
impact of the crisis. 
1.4 Macroeconomic outlook
1.4.1 The global economy
Whereas economies during the
first half of last year still benefit-
ed from stimulus measures as well
as from a rebound in inventories
and a general recovery of the eco-
nomic climate, most regions of
the world recently witnessed
some slowdown in economic
growth. This pattern is also clear-
ly reflected in the Ifo World
Economic Climate (see Figu-
re 1.30). This indicator first
peaked in the second quarter of
2010 and fell during the subse-
quent two quarters. This drop
was solely caused by a fall in
expectations. As Figure 1.31
shows, the economic situation
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a) Arithmetic mean of judgements of the present and expected economic situation.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, Database October 2010 (GDP 2010 and 2011: EEAG forecast); 
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Figure 1.30Expectations have turned causing
the overall indicator to rise again
in the first quarter of this year. 
After having skyrocketed in all
major regions of the world econ-
omy towards winter 2009/10,
expectations did until recently
decline. Especially in Asia, after
having climbed to a historical
high, the fall has been substan-
tial. However, as in Europe and in
North America, a turnaround
has been achieved in the first
quarter of this year: the econom-
ic conditions in half a year time
are expected to improve again
(see Figure 1.32). Only in Latin
America this fall has not been
stopped.
Although many structural prob-
lems remain unsolved or have
been transferred to the public sec-
tor, the uncertainty concerning
economic developments has
again diminished somewhat.
Nevertheless, it remains signifi-
cantly higher than in the years
before the run-up to the crisis.
Although the huge fiscal stimulus
measures together with the very
expansionary monetary policy
stance helped end the recession in
2009, they have now also turned
into the root of the current prob-
lems. It is difficult to predict how
the sovereign debt crisis in
Europe and the unsustainable fis-
cal developments in the United
States will evolve.
Austerity programmes in Europe
and the phasing out of fiscal
stimulus measures in the United
States are not the only reasons for
the current slowdown in econom-
ic growth. The inventory cycle
that was triggered by the liquidity
search of firms caused by the de-
leveraging process during the cri-
sis has ended and will hence no
longer give the strong positive
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impulses to the world economy as it still did during
the first half of last year.
After a strong growth last year, we expect world GDP
to increase by 3.8 percent in 2011, using purchasing-
power-parity adjusted weights to aggregate the
economies. Using market prices, world economic
growth will reach 3 percent. In either case, world eco-
nomic growth will fall back to what can be considered
its long-run average. 
Not all regions will contribute equally to this devel-
opment. Of the four largest economies, Japan shows
the highest level of volatility – after strong growth
last year, it will witness, as compared to the other
regions, a relatively strong decline in its growth rate
(see Figure 1.33). Nevertheless, we expect that Asia
will once more deliver the strongest contribution.
The two larger economic areas, North America and
Europe, will remain below their potential (see
Figure 1.34).
1.4.2 United States
Although a double-dip scenario is not likely to mate-
rialise, growth will slow down somewhat. The contin-
ued low capacity utilisation rate and the remaining
problems on real estate markets and consequently
within the banking industry will allow a further
decline in inflation rates. The inflation rate will turn
out to be around 1.3 percent this year (after 1.6 per-
cent in 2010). To prevent the burgeoning threat of
deflation and to shore up the sluggish economic
recovery, the Federal Reserve already decided in
November of last year to further
increase its purchases of govern-
ment bonds (Quantitative Eas-
ing II). It intends to buy govern-
ment bonds worth nearly 900 bil-
lion US dollars on the bonds
market during the period
November 2010 to June 2011.
Not before mid-year do we
expect the Fed to slowly initiate
an interest-rate-increase cycle.
Hence it will stick to a very
expansionary course throughout
the year.7
The additional purchases of gov-
ernment bonds will partly sup-
press the upward pressure on
long-term interest rates and will thereby reduce the
financing costs of the US government budget deficit.
After the decision was taken in December 2010 to
extend the tax breaks introduced during the Bush era,
fiscal policy is likely to turn expansionary again, with
a budget deficit approaching 10 percent of GDP in
fiscal 2011. Despite the already strong increase in gov-
ernment debt – it surpassed 90 percent in relation to
GDP last year and is bound to increase beyond
100 percent this year – the US government has time
and again made clear that it is determined to stimulate
economic growth. The expansionary impulses, howev-
er, will further increase the already great pressure to
consolidate the government budget and will thus sig-
nificantly weigh on the economic outlook for the
years to come. They also increase the risk that finan-
cial markets will begin to question the high credit rat-
ings of the United States.
Besides the structural problems the US economy is
facing, also some short-term factors will put a drag on
growth. First, despite the weak US dollar, exports will
suffer from the slowdown in world trade growth.
Second, the build-up of inventories has accelerated
steadily since the beginning of last year. This has
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7 Low interest rates and a weak US dollar are already leading to what
might turn out to be unsustainable developments in particular sec-
tors. Raw material prices expressed in US dollars have risen substan-
tially. The resulting boom in agricultural trade – the US trade surplus
in agricultural products turned out to be around 40 billion US dol-
lars in 2010 – combined with low interest rates have triggered a
strong increase in agricultural land prices in the Midwest. During the
second half of the 1970s, expansionary monetary policy also led to
high agricultural land prices. Subsequently, during 1981–1985 the
Midwest experienced its most severe agricultural crisis since the
Great Depression. Tens of thousands of farmers had to give up
because of unsustainable debt levels; their farms were foreclosed.The current private domestic investment share
(13 percent) is well below its 30-year average of
16 percent. Furthermore, interest rates will remain
low and profits, in particular of large corporations,
are currently high. Hence, there is a potential for
investment growth to pick up. However, while the
ISM purchasing managers’ index – which focuses on
large companies – has reached elevated levels again,
the NFIB indicator with its focus on small- and medi-
um-sized enterprises (SMEs) has only slightly recov-
ered from its all-time low. Hence, the general uncer-
tainty that still prevails in particularly in SMEs is like-
ly to keep investment growth suppressed. In addition
to the continuing bleak sales and earnings outlook,
SMEs suffer from their greater dependence on bank
loans. Traditionally, especially smaller banks provide
these loans. However, these continue to suffer from
write-offs and losses on real estate mortgages and
therefore are forced to limit their lending activities. As
noted above, still high foreclosure rates and low
demand for real estate properties indicate that this sit-
uation is not bound to improve soon. Hence, financial
constraints will remain in place for many SMEs. In
previous recovery periods, it was precisely this busi-
ness segment that was responsible for about two-
thirds of the newly created jobs. Currently, however,
the investment and employment plans of these com-
panies remain close to their lows during the crisis.
Another important factor on the part of labour sup-
ply that also speaks against a rapid decline in unem-
ployment is the participation rate. It has declined sig-
nificantly and reached its lowest level since the mid-
1980s. Many of the discouraged workers have most
likely only temporarily left the job market and will,
with improved employment prospects, be returning to
it.8 Due to this and moderate economic growth, the
unemployment rate will decline only slightly and will
average 9.5 percent this year (after 9.7 percent in
2010).
The persistently tense labour market situation that
will also restrain income growth of households is like-
ly to prevent private consumption from expanding
faster than what we have seen last year. Furthermore,
households still face high financial losses as a result of
the real estate and financial crisis. They are also in the
process of gradually reducing their debt positions in
view of future interest rate increases. Finally, the tem-
porary support of private consumption via extended
unemployment benefits and other stimulus measures
will ultimately have to be cut back. To cope with all
this, private saving rates will continue to remain rela-
tively high.
Overall, economic growth in the United States is
expected to decelerate somewhat. GDP is likely to
increase by 2.3 percent this year (after 2.9 percent in
2010).
1.4.3 Asia
In China growth is expected to slow down further. The
risks in the housing market and rising inflationary
pressures will prompt monetary policy to become
more restrictive. Additional interest rate increases are
expected. Furthermore, weak demand from the
United States and the slow appreciation of the ren-
minbi will affect the important Chinese export sector.
China’s trade surplus will remain at a high level.
However, a gradual reduction is to be expected. On
the one hand, world trade growth will stabilise at a
lower level given the expected economic slowdown in
the advanced economies. In addition, the gradual
appreciation of the Chinese currency relative to the
US dollar will continue and – together with stronger
price and wage developments – will slowly deteriorate
Chinese competitiveness.
On the other hand, the outlook for the domestic mar-
ket is still quite optimistic. Although growth will con-
tinue to slow down further, as the restrictive monetary
policy measures will have negative effects particularly
on investment activity, private consumption growth
will further increase. The favourable situation on the
labour market will lead to solid wage increases.
Although growth of investment in housing and public
infrastructure will be slower than last year, the expan-
sion is likely to continue and to support growth. As
the price increases in the property sector are partly a
result of a lack of alternative investment possibilities,
a collapse in the housing market is unlikely. Overall,
the Chinese economy is expected to grow by 8 percent
this year which implies a slight decrease as compared
to last year (9.3 percent).
This winter, private consumption, which has been
particularly strong during the recent quarters, will
put a burden on the recovery in Japan. The phasing
out of fiscal measures will lead to a contractionary
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8 During the crisis years 2008 and 2009, about 8 million jobs were
lost. Last year, 1.4 million were created. At the same time, however,
the working age population of the United States increased by
1.9 million. To keep the unemployment rate constant, about 0.5 mil-
lion persons had to leave the labour force last year alone.EEAG Report 2011 47
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rebound effect. On top of that, the positive impulses
stemming from foreign trade, which – together with
private consumption – were the key forces during the
boom of recent quarters, will decrease considerably.
Besides the general slowdown in world economic
growth, mainly the sharp appreciation of the yen will
dampen exports. For these reasons, a temporary
stagnation of the Japanese economy over the winter
term is expected.
Both the government and the central bank are trying
to counteract this slowdown in economic momentum.
In November, the government put forward a renewed
stimulus package worth 5 trillion yen (about 44 billion
euros). However, at the time of writing it was still
questionable whether – given the huge government
debt – this proposal will receive the required approval
from Parliament. The central bank in turn is under
public pressure to resolve the still-smouldering defla-
tion and to prevent further appreciation of the yen.
To this end, it has set up another purchase pro-
gramme for securities worth about 84 billion euros.
For the first time since 2004, it also intervened direct-
ly in the foreign exchange market in order to weaken
the yen.
These measures together with sustainable develop-
ment in non-residential private investments are likely
to assure that the stagnation during the winter will not
result in a fall-back into recession. Order books have
been recovering since mid-2009 and, thanks to rigor-
ous cost-cutting programmes in recent years, the prof-
it situation of companies is in a sound state.
The slow but steady improvement of the labour mar-
ket situation will support future consumption and
hence also benefit households. Finally, although the
rapid catching-up process in many Asian economies
has slowed down due to more restrictive fiscal and
monetary policy measures, its growth will remain high
enough to benefit the Japanese export industry.
Overall, the continued global demand will be strong
enough to support a sustainable development in
investment activity and allow the labour market to
revive – despite continuing deflation. Nevertheless, a
significantly lower rate of expansion is expected for
this year. GDP will grow by 1.3 percent (after 4.4 per-
cent last year).
The outlook for India remains favourable, even
though the exceptionally high growth rates of 2010
cannot be maintained. Survey results suggest contin-
ued optimism in the economy. For instance, indicators
for the manufacturing sector have picked up again
and increased significantly during the last quarter of
2010. Moreover, in 2010 – unlike the year before – the
monsoon season was very favourable, which will
result in a big harvest. Given the importance of the
agricultural sector in India, this will have substantial
effects on its business cycle.
In contrast, the tight monetary policy designed to
contain inflation will have dampening effects on the
economy. As at the end of last year the central bank
already announced further hikes, more restrictive
measures are expected. However, the strong apprecia-
tion of the rupee and the burden it puts on the export
sector of the country will make it more and more dif-
ficult to implement any further steps.
Overall, the increase in economic activity will slow
down somewhat during the year. Due to the strong
endogenous dynamics of India’s domestic demand,
growth rates will nevertheless remain comparatively
high. For 2011, the increase in GDP is expected to be
8.2 percent.
In the remaining emerging economies of Asia, i.e.
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, a reduction in growth
dynamics is expected. First of all this is due to more
restrictive monetary policies in these countries. For
instance, to prevent inflationary overheating central
banks in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and
Malaysia already have increased their main rates
repeatedly. Additional measures have already been
announced. Second, the region will be impacted by
declining growth in China, the main buyers of inter-
mediate goods produced in these countries. Moreover,
the high inflow of foreign capital in the region will put
domestic currencies under appreciation pressure and
therewith slow down export growth further. This year
growth is expected to return to its long-term trend.
GDP is expected to increase by 5 percent.
1.4.4 Latin America
In 2011 the Latin American region, i.e. Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and  Venezuela, is
expected to grow by 3.9 percent, driven by sustained
growth of domestic demand and supported by high
raw material prices as well as solid macroeconomic
fundamentals. Despite the slowdown, this is still
somewhat above the long-term average for the region.
Next to inflation, specific risks arise from the massivecapital inflows. An unexpected significant outflow
could induce substantial short-term economic fluctu-
ations. For Mexico, the weaker economic momentum
in the United States will be of particular importance,
since about 80 percent of Mexican exports flow into
its neighbouring economy.
1.4.5 Assumptions, risks and uncertainties 
It is assumed that the oil price will fluctuate at around
87 US dollars per barrel over the whole forecasting
horizon and that the exchange rate of the euro will
average around 1.33 US dollars this year. World trade
is expected to increase by 5.9 percent this year, after
having experienced a strong 11.8 percent growth in
2010. It is assumed that there will not be an escalation
of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area that would
endanger its aggregate stability. The current level of
uncertainty still witnessed in financial markets is
expected to only slowly abate. 
A particular risk to the forecast is based on the on-
going tensions in the markets for European govern-
ment bonds. The forecast assumes that the European
authorities have adopted sufficient emergency mea-
sures to prevent a future escalation and dramatic
deterioration of the situation this year. Furthermore,
it is assumed that the affected countries will be able
to carry out the consolidation measures decided
upon. A further massive increase in uncertainty in
financial markets and continued concerns about the
solvency of not only the currently affected peripher-
al countries could significantly increase the financ-
ing costs for all euro-area countries. The European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) implies, if only
temporary, a financial commitment by all member
states. The associated loss in value of the outstand-
ing debt would lead to further problems in the
European banking sector. It would burden the bal-
ance sheets of many banks and could slow the recov-
ery in lending activities, which could in turn jeopar-
dise economic growth.
In addition, if larger countries are forced to draw
upon the EFSF, then the present volume of 750 bil-
lion euros might prove to be insufficient. A possibly
resulting restructuring of the affected public debt
would increase the burden on the banking sector fur-
ther. Fears exist that the European banking system is
not well enough capitalised to withstand such a debt
restructuring. Setting up an even more comprehensive
insurance scheme could dampen growth prospects of
countries at the core of Europe. Chapter 2 of this
year’s report proposes a way forward.
Another risk for global economic developments is
another substantial correction in property prices in
the United States. Although real house prices have
fallen back to levels last seen around 2001 and have
been relatively stable for almost two years now, some
fear that there still is a potential of falling further. The
rising supply of homes as a result of the high number
of foreclosures and the continued slow demand as
also indicated by the weak development of important
leading indicators of construction activity could lead
to further price corrections. This could trigger a fur-
ther downward spiral in household wealth. Further-
more, given the still fragile equity situation of many
banks, in particular small ones, this could hit the US
banking sector particularly hard and thereby pose a
liability to the United States and consequently the
global economy.
A similar threat comes from the Chinese real estate
market. The sharp rise in property prices as a result of
government investment programmes in past years has
some parallels to the development in the United
States. Also in China, a significant proportion of
portfolios of banks and firms consist of real estate
assets. A sharp price correction would curb the expan-
sion of the Chinese economy significantly and – given
the increased importance of China as a sales market –
could jeopardise growth in the rest of the world.
Of course, there are also upside risks to our forecast.
In particular, for the United States we take a cautious
position. The Quantitative Easing II programme of
the Federal Reserve and the recently initiated addi-
tional stimulus measures of the federal government
may not only be able to stabilise the banking sector
but may also induce firms to start investing more
strongly in the future of the US economy. The non-
farm corporate sector is currently sitting on large
amounts of liquid assets, enjoys wide profit margins
and can borrow at historically low costs. A mood
swing to the better would also improve labour market
conditions significantly and thereby further promote
private consumption. 
Also with respect to Europe, a mood swing, this time
on financial markets, could create a more optimistic
growth scenario. Although it is our belief that the
debt crisis in the European periphery is far from
resolved and hence uncertainty and speculation
remain key factors on government bond markets,
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decisive and convincing action of
government authorities might
calm down financial markets
more than currently expected.
1.4.6 The European economy
The cyclical situation
Although the recovery in the
European Union is set to contin-
ue, it will initially lose momentum
in 2011 (see Figure 1.35). Res-
ponsible for this is the current
slowdown in global economic
growth and the increasingly
restrictive fiscal policy environment. Some leading indi-
cators already point towards such a development dur-
ing the winter of 2010/2011. Relative to early 2010, 
Ifo World Economic Surveys indicate that expectations
have deteriorated (see Appendix 1.B). Furthermore, the
inventory cycle will barely give any positive impulses.
Throughout the year, and as indicated by the most
recent Ifo World Economic Survey, the European
economy will be on the mend again, in spite of contin-
uing public saving efforts. All in all, it is expected that
GDP in the European Union will increase by 1.5 per-
cent this year, after 1.8 percent in 2010.
Net exports will contribute positively to growth (see
Figure 1.36). Later this year, the gradually recovering
world economy will foster exports, whereas the rela-
tively weak performance of domestic demand will
cause imports to increase more slowly. Exports of
export-oriented member states like Germany and
Finland are likely to increase at
an above-average pace. Countries
with lower relative competitive-
ness levels are likely to benefit to
a much lesser extent from the
continuing global economic re-
covery, the pace of which how-
ever has slowed down.
The recovery of exports will also
lead to a strengthening of private
investment in 2011. Several other
factors are also likely to have a
positive impact on private invest-
ment. For instance, the ECB
interest rate policy will remain
expansionary throughout the
year, thus sustaining, particularly in the core countries
of the monetary union, the low refinancing cost of
firms. Also, lending standards of banks are likely to
slowly normalize with the advancing clean-up of their
balance sheets. Furthermore, the improved profit sit-
uation of firms should strengthen investment incen-
tives. However, public investment will remain weak
due to the consolidation efforts of governments. 
Employment, sectoral output and inflation
Labour markets usually react with some delay to
changes in economic developments. Firms do not
immediately reduce employment or hire additional
personnel when the environment in which they oper-
ate unexpectedly changes. Due to its lagging charac-
teristic, employment in the European Union reached
its trough early last year (see Figure 1.37). Albeit
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Figure 1.36tive since then. Nevertheless, the
unemployment rate continues its
slight upward trend. This high-
lights that it is not sufficient to
look only at employment move-
ments, i.e. the demand side of
the labour market, to forecast
unemployment developments.
Supply-side considerations also
need to be taken into account.
Hence, a more detailed analysis
is worthwhile. For this we need
to introduce labour force devel-
opments and developments of
the working-age population, i.e.
the potential labour force. A
decrease in the number of unem-
ployed persons can, per defini-
tion, then be decomposed into
the increase in the number of
people employed, the reduction
in the working-age population
and the increase in the number
of discouraged workers. The lat-
ter group consists of those that
decide to leave the labour force
but do not leave the group of
working-age population.
Figure 1.38 shows this decompo-
sition for the large European
countries and the United States
in recent years. It becomes obvi-
ous that, besides developments in
employment, also demographic
factors and the movement in and
out of the labour force can be
quite important for understand-
ing unemployment statistics. 
For instance, in Italy, the num-
ber of unemployed workers went
up by approximately 540 thou-
sand from the second quarter of
2008 until the end of last year.
At the time, employment de-
clined by about 490 thousand
people. This implies an increase
in the labour force of 50 thou-
sand persons. However, Italy
also experienced an increase of
440 thousand persons in its
working-age population. There-
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Decomposition of unemployment rates
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2010, Issue 2.
a) The bars are as percentage of previous period unemployment levels and therefore add up to the annualised 
percentage change in unemployment.
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fore, since the start of the crisis, on top of the change
in unemployed workers, 390 thousand additional
persons have resigned or decided to not enter the
Italian labour force. In essence similar stories can be
told for Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. All of these coun-
tries have experienced a strong withdrawal from the
labour market and therefore a significant reduction
in labour force participation rates. It is likely that
many of these discouraged workers have only left the
labour market temporarily and will return when eco-
nomic conditions improve again. Hence, although
employment might pick up in these countries, this
will not necessarily mean that unemployment will
fall as quickly. 
This phenomenon of a sharp increase in discouraged
workers hardly exists in countries like France or
Spain. In Spain it is striking that the working-age
population has stopped increasing. A possible expla-
nation is that net migration into Spain has declined or
even turned negative. In light of this, the German
labour market story has to be corrected somewhat as
well. Although it is indeed true that – as compared to
other countries – not many jobs were lost during the
crisis, the overall downward trend in unemployment
figures are also at least partly a consequence of a
declining population. It is the only European country
that has shown a consistent decline in its working-age
population since the turn of the century. Nevertheless,
together with Poland, it is at the same time the only
European country that has seen a significant increase
in the share of employed person in the working-age
population since 2008. Demographics alone are cer-
tainly not able to explain labour market developments
in Germany.
On the European level, these changes in labour force
participation coupled with the slowdown of the eco-
nomic recovery will most likely keep the unemploy-
ment rate from falling. It will reach an average of
9.7 percent in the European Union this year (see
Figure 1.39).
Developments of individual sectors will continue to
remain different. It is important to distinguish
between sectors that focus on the domestic market
and those that are export-oriented. The export-orient-
ed sector will depend heavily on the markets on which
these focus. Although growth will also significantly
slowdown in the emerging markets, these markets will
structurally continue to outperform those of more
advanced economies. Development of sectors that are
largely domestically oriented will very much depend
upon the home market. Regional dispersion will
remain high if not increase this year. Although the
recovery in many other sectors started in mid-2009
and will slowly continue this year, the output of the
construction sector is likely to stagnate. 
On average, consumer prices will rise to a similar
extent as last year, i.e. 1.7 and 1.8 percent in the euro
area and European Union, respectively. After an
increase during the winter months, it will come back
to levels below 2 percent. More moderate growth
dynamics will retard the slight upward tendency in
core inflation observed in recent months. 
Differences across Europe
The differences between the individual member coun-
tries remain substantial (see Figure 1.40a). In export-
oriented countries with relatively sound public
finances and without too many
structural problems such as
Sweden, Finland, Germany, Den-
mark, Austria and the Nether-
lands, growth is expected to be
above average. Unemployment is
likely to fall during the year. In
the European periphery, however,
the massive crisis and the need
for consolidation of public and
private budgets will continue to
dampen growth (see Figu-
re 1.40b). The recovery will only
come slowly, as in Italy Spain and
Ireland, or the economies will
remain in recession, as in Greece
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Figure 1.39countries, including the United
Kingdom and Belgium, the
labour market situation will
worsen (see Table 1.A.2 in
Appendix 1.A).
Next year, the German economy
is likely to grow at an above-aver-
age rate. Favourable income
prospects, job security and low
interest rates will support private
consumption and residential
investment. The favourable
financing conditions and good
market prospects in Germany
and – due to the weak euro – also
in the rest of the world will stim-
ulate private investment in
machinery and equipment.
Nevertheless, growth will proba-
bly be considerably less than last
year. First, impulses coming
from the world economy will
abate. The strong world invento-
ry cycle resulting from the finan-
cial crisis will have ended.
Foreign trade will therefore,
unlike last year, no longer pro-
vide a significant impulse to
gross domestic product growth.
Although exports are expected to
increase further, given the strong
domestic economy imports are
likely to expand at least as fast.
Second, the government has initi-
ated a consolidation path, which
in itself will have dampening
effects. In total, GDP will expand
by 2.4 percent this year, which
implies that Germany will remain
in the group of frontrunners in
Europe.
Although a number of tax ben-
efits have been phased out, fis-
cal policy remained accom-
modative in France last year.
This year, however, fiscal con-
solidation plans of the govern-
ment will significantly dampen
the economic expansion.
Spending cuts in the public sec-
tor as well as freezing transfers
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to regional administrations are scheduled. Fur-
thermore, leading economic indicators signal a
slowing of the recovery during this winter. For
instance, new incoming orders have been falling and
according to the Ifo World Economic Survey the
assessment of the first quarter of this year is still
below its long-term average. Especially as the inven-
tory cycle will no longer deliver short-term impuls-
es, the French economy is expected to significantly
lose steam this winter.
Although growth will continue, it will be at a reduced
pace in France as well this year. Restrictive fiscal poli-
cies will have a dampening effect on domestic
demand. The expansionary interest rate policy of the
ECB will keep funding costs low and thereby stimu-
late private investment. As a consequence, the latter is
also expected to deliver the greatest growth contribu-
tion this year. The growth impulse from foreign trade
will be slightly negative as imports continue to grow
faster than exports. All in all, GDP will grow by
1.4 percent in 2011. Accordingly, inflation will turn
out to be moderate and is expected to amount to
1.4 percent. The unemployment rate will remain sta-
ble around a rate just under 10 percent.
This year, supported by the weak pound, the eco-
nomic recovery in the United Kingdom is likely to be
borne by exports. Domestic demand will be retard-
ed by the drastic consolidation measures undertak-
en by the British government. The decline in house
prices is expected to continue with consequences for
private consumption, especially given the restrictive
fiscal policy stance and the deteriorating labour
market situation. So far, the job market has proven
to be surprisingly stable. The unemployment rate,
which was at 7.8 percent as of September last year,
has changed little since the spring of 2009. Now,
however, signs of a deteriorating situation are set-
ting in. The government has announced cuts of
490,000 jobs in the public sector in the next five
years. It is unlikely that private labour demand can
compensate for the layoffs in the public sector. In
October, hiring activity in the service sector stagnat-
ed and even started to sharply decline in industrial
sectors.
For 2011, slower economic growth is expected; GDP
will increase by 1.1 percent. Due to the VAT increase
early this year, the inflation rate, at 2.7 percent, is like-
ly to stay above the target of the Bank of England.
The unemployment rate will increase to an average of
8.2 percent.
In Italy, GDP is expected to increase by only 1 percent
and therefore to stay below the euro-area average. Not
least due to the low interest rates, positive impulses
will arise from private investment, albeit the catching-
up effect after the large drop during the crisis will
slowly phase out. In contrast, growth contributions
from private consumption and foreign trade are likely
to remain moderate. Private consumption will be
attenuated mainly by cuts imposed by the Italian gov-
ernment in the area of public service. Lack of com-
petitiveness, an unfavourable export structure and the
slowdown of world trade will constrain export devel-
opments. Weak domestic development, together with
a weak euro and a slow picking-up of world trade will
allow foreign trade to contribute positively to eco-
nomic growth at the end of this year.
The only moderate recovery of the Italian economy
and the pending reduction in short-time work will
prevent a sustainable recovery of the labour market
this year. The unemployment rate will only decline
slightly to an average of 8.3 percent. Consumer prices
will increase by 1.3 percent this year (after 1.7 percent
last year).
The high government debt level has so far not led to
serious doubts about the solvency of the Italian state.
Although the spreads of Italian government bonds
over German government bonds have risen slightly
during the year, they stayed well below those of the
crisis countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
As the uncertainty in the international financial mar-
kets, however, remains high, it cannot be ruled out
that the sovereign debt crisis will encroach upon Italy
during our forecasting horizon. This is one of the
biggest risks associated with this forecast.
GDP in Spain is expected to show a moderate increase
of 0.6 percent this year. The consolidation of public
finances, initiated in response to the loss of confi-
dence by financial markets, will have a strong negative
impact on the economic recovery of Spain. It is to be
expected that in particular public investment will be
reduced significantly this year. 
Next to the high unemployment rate and weak wage
growth, the reduction of the public deficit is also the
largest negative factor affecting consumer spending.
Private consumption is therefore likely to stagnate or
only increase moderately. A positive impulse is to be
expected from foreign trade. The weak euro and
improved price competitiveness of the Spanish export
sector will stimulate exports. Moreover, Spain willbenefit from the economic recovery of its trading
partners in the euro area expected by the end of the
year. Import growth will slow down due to weak
domestic demand and will lead to an improved trade
balance. Investment, however, should remain weak as
adjustments in the real estate sector have not yet been
completed.
The weak economy will lead to a further rise in unem-
ployment to an average of 21.3 percent this year.
Improvements in the labour market can only be
expected towards the end of the year. The temporary
increase in inflation observed last year will abate, and
inflation is expected to average 0.9 percent this year.
Throughout the year Greece will remain in a reces-
sionary state. Despite improved competitiveness, the
Greek export sector will not be able to deliver impuls-
es substantial enough to compensate for the reces-
sionary state of the domestic economy driven by the
necessary consolidation measures. GDP will decline
by 3.2 percent, whereas the unemployment rate will
climb to an average level of 15.5 percent. 
Although the rescue of the banking sector in Ireland
can be considered a singular event, the structural
deficit has consequently increased permanently. It has
led to a severe increase in interest payments to be ren-
dered in the years to come. After the one-time emer-
gency measures expire, the deficit for next year is
expected to still remain beyond 10 percent of GDP,
and is therefore still high. Nevertheless, Ireland will be
able to slowly leave negative growth dynamics behind.
The increased competitiveness caused by falling prices
will stimulate exports. A lack of domestic demand
will, however, keep the average growth rate for this
year at around zero percent. 
The consolidation measures in Portugal will cause its
GDP growth to turn negative this year. It is expected
that the annual growth rate will fall to –0.3 percent.
As a consequence, the labour market conditions will
further deteriorate slightly and raise the average
unemployment rate to 11.1 percent this year.
In Central and Eastern Europe dynamics in domestic
demand will most likely remain slow. Investment
demand is declining in many countries, and private
consumption is dampened by the austerity pro-
grammes of governments and the generally strong
increase in unemployment. With only a modest
expansion of the domestic economies, the forecasted
recovery is mainly driven by impulses coming from
foreign trade. All in all, GDP of this region will
increase by 3 percent this year.
On 1 January this year, Estonia – a Baltic country with
a population of 1.3 million – entered the euro area. It
has become the 17th country overall, the third one of
the Central and Eastern European members of the
European Union and the first member of the former
Soviet Republic to adopt the euro. Slovenia and
Slovakia had already entered in 2007 and 2009,




Chapter 3 of last year’s EEAG Report was entirely
devoted to the passage from the policy emergency of
providing fiscal life-lines to an ailing global economy
to the policy consequences of a rapid accumulation of
public liabilities (EEAG 2010, Chapter 3). As antici-
pated, fiscal consolidation has indeed become the pol-
icy priority, arguably for the years to come.
In the latest IMF World Economic Outlook, the debt-
to-GDP ratio in the G7 countries is expected to
increase by staggering 40 percentage points by 2015,
as compared to the pre-crisis level in 2007. Of these
40 percentage points, about 20 points can be attrib-
uted to a drop in tax revenues because of the reces-
sion. Another 7 to 8 points is due to the slowdown in
growth relative to interest rates, affecting the dynamic
of the debt-to-GDP ratio, and another 8 points to fis-
cal initiatives aimed at “saving the banks”and lending
operations. Actual discretionary stimulus measures
only amount to 4.5 percentage points. These figures
may give the impression that the deterioration of the
fiscal outlook was not so much the result of outright
policy decisions, but rather followed from the
mechanical effects of “automatic stabilisers” in a
(strongly) recessionary period. So, was the stimulus
small after all? A positive answer would be highly mis-
leading. It would overlook the fact that, in many of
the past financial crises with large output conse-
quences, governments felt compelled to take a conser-
vative fiscal stance. In part, a fiscal contraction in
some chapters of spending was meant to free
resources for “saving the financial system”. In part,
especially for small countries with currencies histori-
cally exposed to the risk of speculative attacks, a fis-
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cal contraction complemented restrictive monetary
policies in an effort to prevent large depreciation of
the exchange rate. The key policy novelty in the cur-
rent global crisis is that, relative to the conservative
strategy commonly followed in the past, policymakers
around the globe decided on the opposite course of
action. As interest rates were slashed almost every-
where, governments decided to let budget deficits
grow with the recession, without undertaking any off-
setting measures. If anything, discretionary measures,
however contained, were also expansionary. The stim-
ulus was large overall. Whether this strategy saved the
world from another great depression or not, its conse-
quences are now troublesome in themselves. 
The recovery from the crisis is currently threatened by
an increasing level of fiscal risk. During the stimulus
phase, in the context of an international panic in
autumn 2008, deficit financing was made easier by the
“flight to quality” by international investors – partic-
ularly benefiting countries with a large GDP relative
to the liabilities of their financial system, with robust
fiscal shoulders and with a reserve currency. The
opposite scenario opened up in the fiscal consolida-
tion phase, in 2010. Reacting to the increasing fiscal
risk, markets have started to charge substantial
default risk premiums to governments, especially in
countries with large, explicit or implicit, fiscal liabili-
ties relative to their perceived “fiscal capacity”. As
these high risk premiums spill-over to the credit con-
ditions faced by the private sector, fiscal risk trans-
lates into a strong recessionary impulse, worsening
endogenously the fiscal conditions of the country.
The flight to quality has now created a great divide
between the handful of governments considered fis-
cally solid, some of which enjoy a negative risk pre-
mium allowing them to borrow extremely cheap
(although they may also suffer from the consequences
of strong capital inflows), and all other countries. But
because of the low risk tolerance among market par-
ticipants, the border between the two groups is flexi-
ble, and almost no country can consider itself com-
pletely insulated from financial turmoil: debt consoli-
dation is the challenge that is facing all policymakers,
albeit in different ways and intensity. 
What is surprising is the fact that the political debate
in recent years underwent a marked shift in focus,
from one crisis situation – keeping the economy going
through stimulus – to another crisis situation – keep-
ing government viable through debt consolidation, as
if the two were unrelated to each other. The lack of a
coherent, forward-looking approach to stabilisation
policy may be understandable in a situation of high
uncertainty about the size and persistence of a slow-
down in global economic activity, accompanied by
widespread malfunctioning of core financial markets.
Yet, there is hardly any justification in treating a fiscal
expansion as a “different policy”, relative to the future
correction measures that this eventually entails to
ensure fiscal viability. The current macroeconomic
conditions offer no room to downplay once again the
link between current and future policy actions.
How should fiscal consolidation proceed? Virtually
everyone agrees on the need to undertake strong mea-
sures to reduce deficits and stabilise public debt, espe-
cially in view of structural (i.e. largely demographic)
factors that would weigh on the fiscal outlook even if
the crisis had never occurred. There is no doubt that
fiscal deficits are bound to be slashed by a combina-
tion of tax hikes and spending cuts. While the exact
composition may and should vary across countries, a
well-established literature suggests that debt consoli-
dation is more likely to be successful when based on
spending cuts, rather than tax increases. This is natu-
rally in the cards in countries where a strong political
constituency defines caps on the tax rates which are
considered politically acceptable – an instance given
by the United Kingdom. Yet, the size of the fiscal cri-
sis is likely to force cuts on virtually all governments,
raising sensitive issue in the reform of the public
administration of countries with a particular poor
record as regards the productivity of public services –
such as Italy. 
In many countries, indeed, the crisis creates a window
of opportunity to fix inefficiencies on both the spend-
ing and the tax side of the budget. For any given tar-
get of tax revenue, for example, the crisis could pro-
vide a strong incentive to change the tax code so as to
rebalance the share of revenues from direct and indi-
rect taxation, increase fairness and, most important,
reduce tax elusion and evasion. 
Independently of the policy debate on the content and
intensity of fiscal correction measures, strong dis-
agreement is emerged about the timing of implement-
ing these measures. Some favour gradualism in imple-
mentation: correction measures should be decided
immediately but should be phased in over time, mak-
ing sure that the strongest measures are only effective
after the economy is comfortably out of recession – a
key indicator would be that monetary policy is no
longer stuck at a near-zero interest rate. Others
emphasise the need to act immediately, front-loadingespecially spending cuts, with the goal of enhancing
policy credibility. 
Let us examine the arguments underlying these posi-
tions in detail. Those in favour of gradualism in
implementation essentially weigh the risk that early
retrenchment could stem recovery. The premise here
is that the recovery is still fragile while monetary pol-
icy is still constrained. Not only are policy rates still
at their “zero lower bound”; financial and monetary
markets are still sub-optimally segmented, jeopardis-
ing the transmission of conventional monetary mea-
sures. Most important, the balance sheets of central
banks are now heavily out of balance, raising the
need to design a monetary exit strategy which may be
hard to keep clean of fiscal implications. To the
extent that we are not out of the financial and real
crisis – the argument goes – an early implementation
of cuts may re-ignite vicious circles whereas low eco-
nomic activity creates the premise for further con-
traction in demand. According to the monetary mod-
els after Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and
Christiano et al. (2009), for instance, a fiscal contrac-
tion would produce deflationary pressures that, given
a zero nominal interest rate, would translate into an
increase in the real interest rate faced by private
agents. This effect would further depress aggregate
demand, creating additional deflationary pressure,
and another round of contraction.
By the same token, on the financial side, one may note
that, per effect of the financial crisis, banks have
arguably become more conservative in providing cred-
it to enterprises. By cutting public spending and pub-
lic work, de facto the government is cutting cash flow
accruing to firms that could be used as “collateral”for
obtaining credit. Hence, in a persistent state of finan-
cial crisis, a fiscal contraction would end up exacer-
bating further the financial constraints firms are fac-
ing, with substantial (multiplicative) effects on eco-
nomic activity, well above the size of the cuts them-
selves. There are indeed reasons to believe that the
transmission of fiscal impulses, usually quite mild
when the economy is operating in normal circum-
stances, becomes much stronger during a financial
and banking crisis. Evidence in this respect is provid-
ed by Corsetti et al. (2010c) for the OECD countries.9
This study shows that the output and consumption
effects from changing fiscal spending is quite con-
tained in general, but become strong during years of
financial crises. During these years, the point estimate
of the “impact spending multiplier” for consumption
and output are as high as 2: one euro of cuts (or
increase) in spending would reduce (or raise) output
by two euros. 
The same argument is actually strengthened by con-
ventional policy wisdom, according to which, while
contemporaneous cuts are recessionary, anticipation
of cuts in the future might exert an expansionary
impulse in the short-run. The transmission channel
works through asset prices, in particular, through
changes in long-term interest rates. The mechanism,
explained in detail by Corsetti et al. (2010a), is
straightforward. Once the economy is out of the
worst recessionary state, demand will start driving
inflation up, prompting the central bank to increase
policy rates, consistent with the goal of maintaining
price stability. On the way out of recession, policy
rates will thus tend to increase with inflation and eco-
nomic activity in both nominal and real terms. If a
fiscal retrenchment is implemented sufficiently far
into the recovery period, it will not push the economy
back into a recession, but, everything else equal, will
exert a deflationary impulse: comparatively, there will
be less demand, hence less inflation. As a result, the
central bank will tend to contain the increase in pol-
icy rates. Now, from today’s perspective, in anticipa-
tion of future retrenchment, the financial market will
therefore tend to forecast a prolonged period of rea-
sonably low rates (or more in general a period of
macroeconomic stability), which will directly trans-
late into a drop of long-term rates. This has expan-
sionary effects already in the short-run, during the
recessionary period, for any given current policy rate.
While the strength of this channel in a crisis situation
is debatable, there are reasons to believe that it is not
negligible. 
Note that anticipation of fiscal retrenchment creates
an incentive for firms to contain price increases, even
before the retrenchment actually takes place. Other
things equal, this means a lower expected path of
inflation and interest rates, from the end of the reces-
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9 Specifically, these authors find that impact multipliers for govern-
ment spending on goods and services are on average quite low, con-
sistent with the large empirical literature on the subject. But they can
become much higher – as high as 2 for output and consumption –
during financial and banking crises (Corsetti et al. 2010b). Un-
expected changes in government spending on final goods and ser-
vices affect output, consumption and investment much more than
one-to-one, conditional on the economy experiencing a “financial
and banking crisis”, according to the classification of Reinhardt and
Rogoff (2008). To be sure, the number of crisis observations in their
OECD sample is relatively limited, and the empirical method adopt-
ed in the study (identifying fiscal shocks from the residuals of simple
fiscal rules) is subject to on-going controversy, so that these estimates
should be taken with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, the empirical evi-
dence unambiguously points to large differences in the macroeco-
nomic effects of government spending between crisis and non-crisis
periods, which appear to be robust to many additional empirical
exercises.EEAG Report 2011 57
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sion onwards. However, the opposite is true in the
short-run, during the recession, because the expan-
sionary effects of low, long-term rates on demand will
tend to increase prices on impact. Everything else
equal, this would stabilize current output and help the
economy out of the recession and the zero-lower-
bound problem. 
No doubt that these arguments have merits. Both may
explain, at least in part, the macroeconomic success of
countries in a relatively good fiscal standing, where
nonetheless the government has taken an explicitly
conservative attitude, with budget deficit spread over
time. These arguments emphasize the stabilizing
effects of a prudent fiscal conduct, where the with-
drawal of past stimulus measures, is matched by
reforms generating lasting cuts in the deficits, with a
progressive reversal of spending even below the pre-
crisis period. 
Yet, these arguments work only under the assumption
that a government is able to pre-determine, in a cred-
ible way, the timing and intensity of the fiscal
retrenchment over the medium term – the transmis-
sion mechanism indeed rests on the assumption that
market prices are stabilised by expectations of
retrenchment. Many countries (some would argue
most countries) may simply not be in the condition of
even trying out this strategy, because of the sheer size
of public debt, adverse cyclical development and/or a
record of weak fiscal institutions. 
The credibility risk in designing correction measures
is indeed the main argument against delayed imple-
mentation. Especially after the events of 2008/2009,
market risk tolerance is low, and investors are ready to
withdraw at the least sign of trouble. A lack of imme-
diate adjustment, reassuring investors, exposes coun-
tries to the highly dangerous risk of losing market
access at reasonable terms, and back precautionary
but significant steps towards fiscal correction also in
the short run.
These cuts will be contractionary in the sense that
the negative impulse of cuts will dampen demand
and therefore economic activity, with respect to an
ideal, virtuous situation in which no immediate cuts
are implemented, yet no risk premium is charged by
international investors. Relative to this benchmark,
it is difficult to expect so-called “non-Keynesian
effects”, where cutting public demand magically pro-
duces a boom. But assuming away risk premiums
virtually amounts to assuming away the problem. In
other words, a situation with no risk of default
priced by the markets is not the relevant “counter-
factual” against which to assess the desirability of
fiscal retrenchment.
The core issue is that immediate fiscal cuts may be
critical in saving a country from “much worse things
to happen”by preventing financial tension in the debt
markets – including the possibility of a self-fulfilling
run on public debt. This point is illustrated by an
extension of the already mentioned work by Corsetti
et al. (2010a) that assess the effects of fiscal cuts in
economies in which private investors charge a risk
premium on public debt depending on (the expected
path of) the debt-to-GDP ratio, realistically affecting
also the interest rates charged on private debt. The
analysis contrasts the effects of a given fiscal retrench-
ment package, implemented either immediately, or
with some delay, in an economy currently in a deep
recession, in which the policy rate is stuck at zero, i.e.
there is no room for monetary authorities to react to
negative shocks by further cutting policy rates. 
The macroeconomic outcome of implementing cuts
immediately is the result of two competing transmis-
sion channels. The first is the classical multiplier chan-
nel from low demand, which is negative, and can be
quite strong if the economy is not out of the crisis (as
stressed by the supporters of gradualism). The second
is the financial channel, which is instead positive, but
only to the extent that cuts are successful in reducing
the risk premium charged by investors to public and
private resident debtors. Which effects prevail? The
simulation model used in that study suggests that, for
standard values of the parameters of the model, an
immediate implementation of retrenchment has actu-
ally limited or no effects on output, according to most
exercises: the two channels offset each other. Small
gains in output are produced only when the initial
debt-to-GDP ratio for the country is very large (above
100 percent), so to make the gains in risk premiums
the overruling concern. In other cases, there is a very
small contraction. With the caveat that the simulation
model is highly stylised, an outcome of neutrality of
spending cuts is actually good news. 
Conversely, the macroeconomic outcome is much
more worrisome when the government delays the
implementation of fiscal retrenchment for a few quar-
ters. A small delay in starting debt consolidation at
best makes the current recession worse – in general it
creates room for unstable market dynamics and/or
indeterminacy. There are in fact major risks in delaying fiscal
retrenchment, if this ends up being implemented over
a horizon in which the economy may not be safely out
of the recession. An instance of which can be illus-
trated as follows. Suppose that, in response to the
news of a retrenchment a few quarters in the future,
private agents arbitrarily developed gloomy expecta-
tions about economic activity. As a lower output
means less tax revenues and higher budget deficits,
they will start charging a higher risk premium on gov-
ernment debt. Since the cost of private debt is corre-
lated to that of public debt, in equilibrium adverse
credit conditions will also hit private agents, with con-
tractionary effects. In normal circumstances, the cen-
tral bank could react to this development by cutting
interest rates. But this is not possible if monetary pol-
icy is already constrained by the zero lower bound –
and alternative strategies such as quantitative easing
do not offer an efficient substitute. Adverse credit
conditions in the private market then cause demand
and therefore output to contract, fulfilling ex post the
initially arbitrary expectations of a cyclical downturn,
enhancing fiscal risk.
How likely are these types of scenarios? The model
and simulations by Corsetti et al. (2010b) single out a
few critical parameters. First, the output elasticity of
tax revenues must be realistically high, roughly in line
with the OECD estimates, i.e. around 0.34. This sim-
ply means that the budget deficit is realistically sensi-
tive to the cycle. Second public debt, including explic-
it and implicit liabilities, must be large enough. In the
simulations, the adverse scenario occurs when debt is
above 100 percent of GDP. Third, the government
risk premium must be realistically correlated to pri-
vate risk premiums – according to a well-established
empirical fact. Finally, the risk premium must be sen-
sitive to the stock of public debt. In the simulations
presented in that paper, such sensitivity is estimated
through an empirical fit of the cross-country evidence
on credit default spreads in April 2010. Un-
fortunately, however, this parameter is quite difficult
to nail down, and, most importantly, appears to be
extremely volatile. In view of this consideration, the
conditions under which policymakers may find their
country vulnerable to market turmoil can be much
less extreme; the debt threshold may be much lower
than 100 percent, for instance.
We believe that it is the risk inherent in the above sce-
nario that provides the most compelling argument in
favour of front-loading deficit cut measures. We
therefore expect that, at least in the industrial world,
countries with an even moderate imbalance in public
finance will take a precautionary stance on the timing
of contractionary measures. 
While fiscal consolidation of the crisis is inescapable,
the above considerations nonetheless suggest that the
appropriate strategy is not the same everywhere.
Obviously, sharp corrections are needed in countries
that already face high and increasing risk premiums
on their debt. Failure to consolidate would not only
raise the cost of borrowing for the government; it
would also undermine macroeconomic stability with
widespread economic costs. In these cases, immediate
cuts in spending and tax hikes would signal the gov-
ernment’s commitment to consolidation, even if, other
things equal, their short-run costs in terms of output
are not negligible (but would be much higher in the
absence of correction). 
Yet it is important to emphasise that the credibility
and success of fiscal correction measures will not be
judged by their capacity to generate a positive cash
flow for a few quarters, but on the grounds of their
sustainability, and their budget and growth effects in
the medium to long run. Now is not the time for
accounting tricks and budget gimmicks. 
In countries where risk premiums have remained low,
improving the fiscal outlook is no less urgent, but it
would be advisable to design consolidation strategies
that foresee more steady adjustment. Adopting
strongly frontloaded strategies, to signal immediate
improvement in fiscal cash flows, can be tempting as
an extra insurance against market jitters. However,
under the present circumstances, it would be wise to
also assess the downside risks very carefully. Through
their effects on aggregate demand, excessive contrac-
tionary measures may actually be bad for the fiscal
outlook, and inconsistent with the overall goal of pro-
viding a stable macroeconomic environment for
households and firms to recover confidence.
1.5.2 Monetary policy
Since the launch of the monetary union, significant
macroeconomic imbalances have developed between
the euro-area countries, taking the shape of massive
current account deficits in the peripheral countries
and significant surpluses in other countries, specifical-
ly Germany. In principle, such imbalances can have
positive effects if current account surpluses or deficits
trigger cash flows that lead to higher investments in
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the countries in which the marginal productivity of
capital is high. The problem in the euro area does not
consist of the asymmetries per se but in the fact that
capital inflows in many countries have financed a con-
sumption boom, non-sustainable levels of govern-
ment and private debt as well as real estate bubbles.
This in turn has led to substantial price increases with
drastic effects on the countries’ competitiveness.
What the deficit countries need – not least to stabilise
their debt situation – is to increase their competitive-
ness in order to reduce their current account deficits.
However, as members of the euro area, raising com-
petitiveness via currency devaluation is no longer an
option. Consequently, various price trends – and thus
the real exchange rate – must play this role here. This
process has already started: excluding various tax
increases, inflation rates in the peripheral countries
are now well below the euro-area average. 
The price adjustment process may be expected to con-
tinue. The crisis in the peripheral countries is substan-
tially more serious and tenacious than in other euro-
area countries, not least due to the acrimonious fiscal
consolidation packages. In this context, persistently
high unemployment will place a significant strain on
wages. In contrast, due to continuous improvements
on the labour market, private domestic demand is
expected to make a more significant contribution
towards growth than in the pre-crisis years, especially
in Germany.
Given this background of persistent asymmetries
between the euro-area countries, the formulation of
monetary policy remains a challenging task for the
ECB. Nevertheless, monetary framework conditions
in the coming years are expected to promote a further
decline in foreign trade imbalances via relative price
trends in the euro area. Monetary policy in the euro
area is guided by the inflation prospects of the entire
euro area. As a consequence, the decisive ECB inter-
est rate may be too restrictive for some countries and
too expansive for others. 
One way of researching this diverging economic effect
of monetary policy consists in estimating the ECB’s
interest rate setting behaviour for the entire euro area
with the help of a so-called reaction function and
comparing it with an analogously calculated counter-
factual target interest rate for each member state.10
The country-specific interest rate indicates the interest
rate the ECB would have chosen had the conditions in
the respective country been prevalent in the entire
euro area. Where the difference between the two inter-
est rates is positive, the country’s situation requires a
higher interest rate than the one set by the ECB. If, on
the other hand, the difference is negative, the ECB’s
target interest rate is too high.
The ECB target rate is estimated to be 0.75 percent
by the end of last year. Comparison of the devia-
tion between the individual appropriate interest
rates and the ECB interest rate shows that, in the
years before the crisis, the ECB interest rate was
systematically too low in Greece, Ireland and Spain
(see Figure 1.41). In contrast, the ECB interest rate
was almost consistently too high in the case of
Germany. Since the outbreak of the crisis, however,
the situation in numerous euro-area countries has
been reversed. If, for example, the recession were as
serious in all countries as it is in Greece, Ireland
and Spain (and no zero interest rate barrier exist-
ed), the ECB would currently opt for a significant-
ly lower interest rate. Germany represents the other
extreme: if the ECB was guided by the German
economy, the target interest rate would currently be
around 2 percent.
However, since the ECB’s decisions are based on
the situation of the entire euro area, the discrepan-
cies are expected to persist, with price trends con-
tinuing to diverge substantially in the coming years.
On the one hand, expansive interest rates in
Germany will stimulate economic activity and will
tend to result in price increases. On the other hand,
the restrictive interest rates in the peripheral coun-
tries will contribute towards slowing down their
economic activity.
Although these developments are certainly not wel-
come from an economic policy point of view, as well
as increasing the risk of a deflationary spiral, they
also put a lid on inflation rates. In the long term, this
would boost the competitiveness of the countries in
question.
The estimated ECB reaction function can also be used
to forecast the interest rate policy in the near future.
Assuming that the current ECB interest rates again
follow the model applicable to the first decade of the
single monetary policy, this rule indicates that the
appropriate interest rate since August, 2010 has
assumed positive values again. In December 2010, the
estimated target rate for the euro area equals 0.75 per-
10 The approach taken here is based on Sturm and Wollmershäuser
(2008) and used in the 2007 and 2009 EEAG reports.cent. Its difference with the actual main refinancing
rate and the interbank market rate has been reduced
substantially.
Given that inflation will remain below 2 percent and
no strong growth is expected, the ECB should keep its
main refinancing rate at 1 percent. In view of increas-
ing capacity utilisation rates in 2012, it should imple-
ment a first interest rate adjustment by the end of this
year. Using our forecast to extend the estimated reac-
tion function indeed suggests a first hike by the end of
2011.
Also for other reasons such a rise is to be favoured.
Notwithstanding its influence on production and
prices, a continuing very low interest rate is also asso-
ciated with risks to financial stability. Negative real
lending rates imply that also banks without a sustain-
able business model will continue to be supported and
compromise the functioning of the interbank money
market. Another problem may arise when insurance
and pension funds, engaged in long-term financial
obligations, cannot earn the required returns by
investing in safe securities. This will raise the incentive
to take on excessive risks.
Furthermore, banks that expect low interest rates to
remain at the short end of the term structure have
an incentive to increase short-term debt positions.
This increases their liquidity risk that may materi-
alise at a later stage. In addition, market partici-
pants might expect that the effects of future liquidi-
ty crises in the banking sector will again be alleviat-
ed by monetary policy measures. This effect could
also increase the incentives for banks to choose
riskier lending strategies.
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GDP growth, inflation and unemployment in various countries 
GDP growth CPI inflation  Unemployment rate
d)
in % in %
 Share  of
total GDP
in % 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
Industrialised
countries: 
EU27  31.9  –4.2 1.8 1.5  0.8 1.9  1.8 9.0 9.6  9.6 
Euro  area  24.2  –4.0 1.7 1.4  0.3 1.6  1.5 9.5  10.1  10.1 
Switzerland  1.0  –1.9 2.7 1.9  –0.7 0.6  0.8 4.3 4.7  4.2 
Norway  0.7  –1.4 1.9 2.1  2.3 2.6  2.1 3.2 4.8  4.8 
Western and Central Europe 33.6  –4.0 1.8 1.6  0.8  1.9  1.7  8.8  9.5  9.5 
United  States  27.6  –2.6 2.9 2.3  –0.3 1.6  1.3 9.3 9.7  9.5 
Japan 9.8  –6.3 4.4 1.3  –1.4  –0.9  –0.4  5.3  5.8  5.6 
Canada  2.6  –2.5 3.2 2.6  0.3 1.8  1.8 8.3 8.7  9.0 
Industrialised countries 
(total) 73.6  –3.7 2.6  1.9  0.1 1.4  1.3 8.4 9.0  8.9 
Newly industrialised
countries: 
Russia 2.4  –7.9 4.4 4.3 
China and Hongkong  9.9  8.2 9.7 8.0 
India 2.4  6.7 9.3 8.2 
East Asia
a) 4.9  0.2 7.2 5.0 
Latin America
b) 6.8  –2.1 5.9 3.9 
Newly industrialised
countries (total) 26.4  2.5 7.7  6.1 
Total
c) 100.0  –2.1 4.0 3.0 
World trade, volume   –1.1 11.8 5.9 
a) Weighted average of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Philippines, Singapore. Weighted with the 2009 levels
of GDP in US dollars. – 
b) Weighted average of Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela.
Weighted with the 2009 levels of GDP in US dollars. – 
c) Weighted average of the listed groups of countries. –
d)Standardised unemployment rate.
Source: EU, OECD, IMF, National Statistical Offices, 2010 and 2011: forecasts by the EEAG.EEAG Report 2011 62
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Table 1.A.2 




in % in % Share of total
GDP in %  2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Germany  20.4  –4.7 3.7 2.4 0.2 1.2 1.8 7.5 6.9 6.2 
France  16.3  –2.5 1.5 1.4 0.1 1.7 1.4 9.5 9.8 9.9 
Italy  12.9  –5.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.7 1.3 7.9 8.5 8.3 
Spain 8.9  –3.6 –0.2  0.6  –0.2  1.7  0.9  18.1  20.1  21.3 
Netherlands  4.8  –3.9 1.7 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.4 3.7 4.5 4.3 
Belgium  2.9  –2.8 2.0 1.6 0.0 2.3 1.6 7.9 8.4 8.9 
Austria  2.3  –3.9 2.0 1.8 0.4 1.6 1.9 4.9 4.7 4.3 
Greece  2.0  –2.3 –4.3 –3.2  1.3  4.7  1.7  9.5 12.4 15.5 
Finland  1.4  –8.0 2.9 2.7 1.6 1.7 2.2 8.2 8.4 8.0 
Ireland  1.4  –7.6 –0.5  0.0 –1.7 –1.6  0.0 11.9 13.5 14.8 
Portugal  1.4  –2.6 1.7 –0.3 –0.9  1.4  0.9  9.6 10.9 11.1 
Slovakia  0.5  –4.8 4.0 3.2 0.9 0.7 2.3  12.0  14.5  14.0 
Slovenia  0.3  –8.1 0.9 1.8 0.9 2.1 2.5 5.9 7.2 7.0 
Luxembourg  0.3  –3.7 2.5 2.2 0.0 2.8 2.1 5.1 4.7 4.7 
Cyprus  0.1  –1.7 0.6 1.1 0.2 2.6 2.4 5.3 6.8 7.2 
Estonia  0.1  –13.9 2.2 3.7 0.2 2.7 3.2  13.8  17.5  16.0 
Malta  0.0  –2.1 3.4 2.3 1.8 2.0 2.4 7.0 6.8 6.4 
Euro area
c) 76.1  –4.0 1.7 1.4 0.3 1.6 1.5 9.5  10.1  10.1 
United  Kingdom 13.3  –4.9 1.4 1.1 2.2 3.2 2.7 7.6 7.9 8.2 
Sweden  2.5  –5.1 5.0 3.4 1.9 1.9 2.0 8.3 8.4 7.5 
Denmark  1.9  –5.2 2.2 1.9 1.1 2.2 2.5 6.0 7.4 6.6 
EU20
c) 93.8  –4.2 1.8 1.5 0.6 1.8 1.7 9.1 9.6 9.7 
Poland  2.6  1.7 3.8 4.2 4.0 2.7 2.9 8.2 9.6 9.2 
Czech  Republic 1.2  –4.1 2.4 2.3 0.6 1.2 1.9 6.7 7.2 7.0 
Romania  1.0  –7.1 –2.0 1.0 5.6 6.0 5.1 6.9 8.3 8.7 
Hungary  0.8  –6.7 1.0 2.4 4.0 4.7 4.1  10.0  11.0  10.7 
Bulgaria  0.3  –4.9 –0.1 2.4 2.5 3.0 2.9 6.8 9.8 9.4 
Lithuania  0.2  –14.7 0.3 2.9 4.2 1.1 2.1  13.7  18.1  17.5 
Latvia  0.2  –18.0 –0.9 2.8 3.3  –1.2 1.0  17.1  20.9  18.6 
New members
d) 6.2  –3.3 1.8 2.9 3.5 3.0 3.1 8.2 9.8 9.6 
EU27
c) 100.0  –4.2 1.8 1.5 0.8 1.9 1.8 8.9 9.6 9.6 
a) Harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). – 
b) Standardised unemployment rate. – 
c) Weighted average of the
listed countries. –
d) Weighted average over Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia.
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD, IMF, 2010 and 2011 forecasts by the EEAG.
Table 1.A.3 
Key forecast figures for the EU27 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
Percentage change over previous year 
Real gross domestic product
     Private consumption
     Government consumption 
     Gross fixed capital formation




























Percentage of nominal gross domestic product
Governmental fiscal balance
c) –2.3 –6.8 –6.8 –5.1 
Percentage of labour force 
Unemployment rate
d) 7.0 8.9 9.6 9.6 
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous year). – 
b) Harmonised consumer price
index (HCPI). – 
c) 2010 and 2011: forecasts of the European Commission. – 
d) Standardised unemployment rate.
Source: EUROSTAT, 2010 and 2011 forecasts by the EEAG.EEAG Report 2011 63
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Table 1.A.4 
Key forecast figures for the euro area
2008 2009 2010 2011 
Percentage change over previous year 
Real gross domestic product
     Private consumption
     Government consumption 
     Gross fixed capital formation




























Percentage of nominal gross domestic product
Governmental fiscal balance
c) –2.0 –6.3 –6.3 –4.6 
Percentage of labour force 
Unemployment rate
d) 7.5  9.5 10.1 10.1 
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous year). – 
b) Harmonised consumer price
index (HCPI). – 
c) 2010 and 2011: forecasts of the European Commission. – 
d) Standardised unemployment rate.
Source: EUROSTAT, 2010 and 2011 forecasts by the EEAG.Appendix 1.B
Ifo World Economic Survey (WES)
The Ifo World Economic Survey (WES) assesses
worldwide economic trends by polling transnational
as well as national organizations worldwide about
current economic developments in the respective
country. This allows for a rapid, up-to-date assess-
ment of the economic situation prevailing around the
world. In January 2011, 1,117 economic experts in
119 countries were polled. WES is conducted in co-
operation with the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) in Paris.
The survey questionnaire focuses on qualitative infor-
mation: on assessment of a country’s general eco-
nomic situation and expectations regarding important
economic indicators. It has proved to be a useful tool,
since economic changes are revealed earlier than by
traditional business statistics. The individual replies
are combined for each country without weighting.
The “grading” procedure consists in giving a grade
of 9 to positive replies (+), a grade of 5 to indifferent
replies (=) and a grade of 1 to negative (–) replies.
Grades within the range of 5 to 9 indicate that posi-
tive answers prevail or that a majority expects trends
to increase, whereas grades within the range of 1 to
5 reveal predominantly negative replies or expecta-
tions of decreasing trends. The survey results are pub-
lished as aggregated data. The aggregation procedure
is based on country classifications. Within each coun-
try group or region, the country results are weighted
according to the share of the specific country’s
exports and imports in total world trade.
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